|  |  |
Figure 1.
The region’s middle-income countries withstood the financial turmoil well because they were better prepared
than in 1997-98
 | Figure 2.
Real GDP growth has slowed fast
  | Figure 3.
Openness to trade and export concentration explain a sizable part of the impact of the crisis on growth |
|
|  |  |
Figure 4.
Purchaser managers have become more optimistic in China and more pessimistic in Philippines
 | Figure 5.
Industrial production has
fallen sharply
 | Figure 6.
The decline in exports led the slowdown in industrial production
 |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 7.
Inventories have risen as a share of shipments
  | Figure 8.
Capacity utilization has
slumped | Figure 9.
The region’s exports relative to GDP are among the highest among emerging markets, 2008
 |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 10.
Exports have fallen sharply
in a synchronized fashion,
2007-2009 | Figure 11.
The annual contractions in exports are oversized,
January 2009 | Figure 12.
The region’s exports have fallen most sharply to Japan, average November’08-January’09
  |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 13.
And the income impact from the decline in commodity prices is the largest for the poorer countries (in percent of GDP)
  | Figure 14.
Foreign bank claims have been reduced | Figure 15.
More people will remain in poverty as a result of the crisis |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 16.
The number of poor is projected to increase in Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and
Timor-Leste in 2009
   | Figure 17.
The crisis will slow the pace of poverty reduction in the region | Figure 18.
Nonperforming loans are relatively low for most countries, but concerns are emerging |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 19.
Monetary easing has helped reduce interbank rates except in Indonesia | Figure 20.
Credit growth in Cambodia and Mongolia has slowed after reaching nearly 100 percent earlier
  | Figure 21.
Currencies have weakened in most countries except China and the Philippines |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 22.
The contribution of stimulus and automatic stabilizers in 2009 varies
  | Figure 23.
The size of stimulus packages varies substantially | Figure 24.
Most packages biased toward spending measures |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 25.
The size of stimulus packages falls short of output gaps | Figure 26.
Financing requirements are burdensome for some governments
  | Figure 27.
Domestic bond yields have risen |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 28.
Corporate spreads in Indonesia have risen substantially more than government spreads
  | Figure 29.
Real GDP growth: U.S., Eurozone and Japan | Figure 30.
Export growth, U.S., Eurozone and Japan |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 31.
Automobile sales have fallen sharply | Figure 32.
Industrial production is contracting | Figure 33.
Equity prices have collapsed after peaking in late 2007
  |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 34.
Interbank rates have eased, but worries about liquidity, counterparty risks, and the economy remain | Figure 35.
Spreads on emerging market sovereign bonds have eased but remain much higher than before the crisis, 2007-2009
  | Figure 36.
Corporate borrowing spreads have also risen substantially, 2007-2009 |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 37.
Excess reserves in the U.S. and the eurozone | Figure 38.
Foreclosures in the U.S. have surged | Figure 39.
And the CBO projects the impact on GDP in the U.S. to offset only partly the impact of the crisis
  |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 40.
Commodity prices have firmed of late | Figure 41.
Oil prices have stabilized due to the OPEC cuts, but inventories have surged | Figure 42.
The contribution of developing East Asia to global output in 2009 is the largest in the world
  |
 |
 |  |  |
Figure 43.
China’s increase in nominal GDP has surpassed that of the U.S. since 2007 and is the largest in the world | Figure 44.
And the change in China’s nominal imports exceeded that in the U.S. since 2007, 2000-2008 | Figure 45.
Recessions with crunches, housing and equity busts last longer |
RSS