Overview
 The crisis that erupted in May 2006 in Timor-Leste reflects larger tensions of a society that has undergone massive social change in the last 35 years, and where state institutions, formal sector employment and supra-local identities are all relatively new. Having been the most far-flung and impoverished of Portugal’s colonies, the Indonesian occupation further isolated Timor-Leste. In 1975, less than 10 percent of Timorese were literate, and tertiary education only became broadly available in the late 1980s. Formal sector employment was known only to a tiny elite during Portuguese colonial rule and expanded but was still very limited under the Indonesian occupation. Electricity reached most district capitals only in the 1980s. In 1965, Dili had c. 10,000 residents; forty years later, it had 167,000. Customary leadership, mechanisms for dispute resolution, and administration of land and other resources remain vibrant in rural areas but are unsurprisingly under strain in towns, particularly Dili. The institutions of the state are weak and poorly understood, and are therefore of limited relevance to most people.
The effects and aftermath of last year’s crisis can still be felt in Timor-Leste. Numerous camps for the internally displaced still exist both in Dili and surrounds, and communities remain divided both mentally and physically along “east-west” lines. The causes of the crisis are complex. Generally, the sacking of one-third of the military (F-FDTL) in March 2006 is understood to have triggered the crisis. The underlying causes are widely thought to lie in past “battles and betrayals” between Fretilin and other parties, rivalries between the political elite, institutional flaws in the creation of F-FDTL, a very weak and politicized police force, deep disenchantment with the first government over issues ranging from poor communication to increased constraints on civil liberties, as well grievances over land and property rights, particularly in Dili.
Among the most visible elements of the crisis in Timor-Leste last year was the involvement of youth in widespread violence. Indeed, fighting amongst groups of youth is currently the most distressing manifestation of the ongoing crisis and instability. There have been some short-term attempts to address the problem of youth violence. For example, the government, working with the International Labour Organisation (ILO), rapidly launched a cash-for-work program that mostly benefited youth. Although such efforts are commendable, this report argues that the problem of youth violence is both deeper and broader—and that only a comprehensive understanding and strategy can address the challenge of the current youth crisis in both the short- and longer-term... This report argues for a concerted, long-term investment in youth by the government and the international community. The report consists of three chapters.
Chapter one examines the factors that put youth at risk of violent behavior and that lead youth to engage in violence; the findings are summarized in Chart 1 below. The analysis in this chapter suggests the dire need for a comprehensive framework that tackles the economic, social and political predicament of youth in Timor-Leste.
Chapter two presents an initial attempt to determine the broad contours of a comprehensive framework. The first section suggests eight principles that should guide youth development. The second section identifies five policy priorities for addressing the youth crisis, they are: 1) Keep youth in school; 2) Increase youth employment opportunities; 3) Connect youth with community; 4) Empower youth to participate in nation-building; and 5) Strengthen formal and informal controls on youth. The third section (of chapter two) provides a list of interventions and programs that could address these policy priorities. This is drawn from international experience and a range of contexts. Section four suggests a set of criteria for prioritizing programmatic interventions. Chapter three recommends six priority interventions. These are: 1) Expand cash/in-kind school programs; 2) Re-establish youth centers; 3) Expand labor-intensive youth employment programming; 4) Re-establish community-driven development programming with a youth focus; 5) Support a youth-led communication program; and 6) Support a community justice and safety program. Table 1 presents the policy priorities, intervention options, and recommendations.
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