| Title | Authors | Date |
| The Body of Knowledge on Utility Regulation | Mark Jamison, Sanford Berg, Farid Gasmi and Jose Tavara | New |
| World Bank and PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility) Web Site |
| This site provides summaries of and links to the more than 300 references, an 80+ page glossary and self-testing features to facilitate learning. The references include publications and decisions by regulatory agencies and other governmental bodies; policy advisories by think tanks, consultants, donor agencies, and others; and research by academics, consultants, and other experts. (Website) |
| Big Challenges, Small States: Regulatory Options to Overcome Infrastructure Constraints | David Ernhardt and Chloe Oliver | 5/1/2007 |
| PPIAF Publication |
| Small island economies face special challenges in providing affordable infrastructure services. Effective regulation can help, by encouraging providers to seek innovative solutions better suited for small and remote islands. But conventional regulation may be out of reach for small islands, requiring more money, competence, and independence than they have. Low-discretion rules and ‘light’ or regional regulatory bodies may be good alternatives. |
| Does a Menu of Regulatory Options Offer More Lasting Solutions? | Anton Eberhard | 5/1/2007 |
| PPIAF Publication |
| Developing countries attempting to implement the standard model of independent regulation have encountered many problems and challenges. These may arise when a regulatory system is incompatible with the country’s regulatory commitment and institutional and human resource endowment. Selecting from a menu of regulatory options to create a hybrid model—one that best fits a country’s own circumstances and challenges—can improve regulatory performance. |
| Economic Regulation of Urban Water and Sanitation Services: Some Practical Lessons | David Ehrhardt, Eric Groom, Jonathan Halpern, and Seini O’Connor | 4/1/2007 |
| Water Sector Board Discussion Paper Series Paper No.9 |
| This paper discusses the regulation of water and sanitation services in urban areas. Specifically, it explores ways of thinking about regulatory design as part of a wider, country-specific program to reform the way in which water supply and sanitation services are provided and paid for. In the past, regulatory advisers often focused on the need to introduce international best practice— generally in the form of an independent regulatory organization—to solve a wide range of performance problems. However, this approach was seldom straightforward, nor was it always successful. |
| The Pricing Dynamics of Utilities with Underdeveloped Networks | Kessides, Ioannis N. and Chisari, Omar O. | 4/1/2007 |
| Policy, Research Working Paper ; no. WPS 4198 |
| This paper uses an analytically tractable intertemporal framework for analyzing the dynamic pricing of a utility with an underdeveloped network (a typical case in most developing countries) facing a competitive fringe, short-run network adjustment costs, theft of service, and the threat of a retaliatory regulatory review that is increasing with the price it charges. Under a variety of plausible assumptions (in the context of developing countries) the utility will find its long-run profits enhanced if it exercises restraint in the early stages of network development by holding price below the limit defined by the unit costs of the fringe. The utility's optimal price gradually converges toward the limit price as its network expands. Moreover, when the utility is threatened with retaliatory regulatory intervention, it will generally have incentives to restrain its pricing behavior. |
| Price Structure and Network Externalities in the Telecommunications Industry : Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa | Iimi, Atsushi | 4/1/2007 |
| Policy, Research Working Paper ; no. WPS 4200 |
| The paper examines what factor facilitates most network expansion using micro data from 45 fixed-line and mobile telephone operators in 18 African countries. It finds that many telephone operators in the region use peak and off-peak prices and termination-based price discrimination, but are less likely to rely on strategic fee schedules such as tie-in arrangements. The estimated demand function based on a discreet consumer choice model indicates that termination-based discriminatory pricing can facilitate network expansion. It also shows that the implied price-cost margins are significantly high. Thus, price liberalization could be conducive to development of the telecommunications network led by the private sector. |
| Unsolicited Infrastructure Proposals: How Some Countries Introduce Competition and Transparency | John T Hodges, Georgina Dellacha | 2/1/2007 |
| PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility) Publication |
| This paper assesses the major issues and impact of “unsolicited proposals” which are not requested by a government and usually originate within the private sector. It suggests some unsolicited proposals, when subject to competition and transparency, may contribute to the overall infrastructure goals of countries. |
| The Challenge of Reducing Non-Revenue Water (NRW) in Developing Countries How the Private Sector Can Help: A Look at Performance-Based Service Contracting | Bill Kingdom, Roland Liemberger, Philippe Marin | 12/1/2006 |
| Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board Discussion Paper Series Paper No. 8 |
| In this report, a number of case studies, taken from some of the largest and most recent performance-based NRW contracts, are studied and discussed in terms of their technical and financial performance. Lessons learned from the case studies are analyzed, showing the potential benefits of NRW performance-based service contracting with the private sector. |
| Political accountability and regulatory performance in infrastructure industries : an empirical analysis | Farid Gasmi, Paul Noumba Um, Laura Recuero Virto | 12/1/2006 |
| World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4101 |
The aim of this paper is to empirically explore the relationship between the quality of political institutions and the performance of regulation. Taking the view that political accountability is a key factor that links political structures and regulatory processes, the authors investigate, for the case of telecommunications, its impact on the performance of regulation in two time-series-cross-sectional data sets. In addition to confirming some well documented results on the positive role of regulatory governance in infrastructure industries, the authors provide empirical evidence on the impact of the quality of political institutions and their modes of functioning on regulatory performance. The analysis of the data sets shows that the (positive) effect of political accountability on the performance of regulation is stronger in developing countries. (Size: 0.45 MB) |
| Utilities reforms and corruption in developing countries | Antonio Estache, Ana Goicoecha | 12/1/2006 |
| World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4081 |
This paper shows empirically that "privatization" in the energy, telecommunications, and water sectors, and the introduction of independent regulators in those sectors, have not always had the expected effects on access, affordability, or quality of services. It also shows that corruption leads to adjustments in the quantity, quality, and price of services consistent with the profit-maximizing behavior that one would expect from monopolies in the sector. The results suggest that privatization and the introduction of independent regulators have, at best, only partial effects on the consequences of corruption for access, affordability, and quality of utility services. (Size: 0.35 MB) |
| Strengthening Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption | World Bank Development Committee | 9/8/2006 |
| World Bank Development Committee paper DC2006-0017 |
This paper responds to the Development Committee’s request for a document articulating the World Bank Group’s strategy for heightening its focus on governance and anticorruption as an integral part of its work to reduce poverty and promote growth. It also responds to the increasing demand for governance and anticorruption engagement from stakeholders worldwide. (Size: 0.5 MB) |
| Reforming Power Markets in Developing Countries: What Have We Learned? | John E. Besant-Jones | 9/1/2006 |
| World Bank Energy and Mining Sector Board Discussion Paper series No. 19 |
| This paper compiles the lessons of experience from the reforming of power markets of developing countries and transition economies. The paper acts a sourcebook of about 240 references to this documented experience and complements the World Bank’s Operational Guidance Note for Public and Private Roles in the Supply of Electricity Services by compiling lessons of this experience that help in applying the Note’s guidance. (Size: 1.3 MB) |
| Taking Account of the Poor in Water Sector Regulation | Sophie Trémolet and Catherine Hunt | 8/1/2006 |
| World Bank Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board Working Note, Paper No. 11 |
Regulatory frameworks can have a decisive influence on making water and sanitation services more accessible to the poor and on giving service providers the right incentives to serve them. In some cases, however, existing regulatory frameworks may introduce obstacles to serving the poor rather than provide an environment conducive to extending service. This note seeks to provide practical guidance on how regulatory frameworks can be designed and implemented in a way that is more conducive to expanding access and improving service to poor customers. (Size: 1.1 MB) |
| Regulation of water and sanitation services: getting better service to poor people | Sophie Trémolet and Jonathan Halpern | 6/1/2006 |
| GPOBA (The Global Partnership on Output-Based Aid) Working Paper No. 8 |
OBA approaches to improving water and sanitation service can work in a variety of circumstances. Such OBA schemes require an understanding of the impact of existing regulatory arrangements have on water services to poor customers. The design of OBA schemes should therefore include an evaluation of the existing regulatory arrangement in order to identify what changes could potentially be made in order to get better services to poor people. (Size: 0.71 MB) |
| Handbook for evaluating infrastructure regulatory systems | Ashley C. Brown, John Stern, Bernard Tenenbaum and Defne Gencer | 6/1/2006 |
| World Bank publication |
More than 200 new infrastructure regulators have been created around the world in the last 15 years. They were established to encourage clear and sustainable long-term economic and legal commitments by governments and investors to encourage new investment to benefit existing and new customers. There is now considerable evidence that both investors and consumers-the two groups that were supposed to have benefited from these new regulatory systems-have often been disappointed with their performance. The fundamental premise of this book is that regulatory systems can be successfully reformed only if there are independent, objective and public evaluations of their performance. (Available for purchase) |
| Explanatory Notes on Key Topics in the Regulation of Water and Sanitation Services | Eric Groom, Jonathan Halpern, and David Ehrhardt | 6/1/2006 |
| World Bank Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Board Discussion Paper Series, Paper No. 6 |
| Considerable confusion has arisen about what regulation means in the context of water supply and sanitation (WSS) services. In particular, there are questions about the application of the "independent regulator" model to WSS in the developing world. What types of problems can it can address effectively? What is its relevance, especially as provision and oversight of these services are often the responsibility of subnational governments with limited resources? The Explanatory Notes on Key Topics in the Regulation of Water and Sanitation Services provide a consistent set of principles and practices that respond to these questions. Such information will be of interest to service providers, policy makers, and development practitioners interested in improving the performance of WSS services in urban areas. (Size: 1.1 MB) |
| How to improve regulatory transparency | Lorenzo Bertolini | 6/1/2006 |
| PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility) Gridlines Note No.11 |
| Managing the different and often conflicting interests and expectations of stakeholders—the government, consumers, service providers—is a demanding task for infrastructure regulators. Transparency can be a big help. A core principle of good regulatory governance, transparency creates credibility for regulatory decisions and helps foster sustainable investment in infrastructure. How can policymakers and regulators best improve regulatory transparency? A recent PPIAF-funded review of international experience identifies emerging lessons. (Size: 1.7 MB) |
| Regulatory Frameworks for Water Resources Management: A Comparative Study | Salman M. A. Salman , Daniel D. Bradlow | 6/1/2006 |
| World Bank Law, Justice and Development Series paper 36216 |
| This title examines how regulatory frameworks have addressed the various basic issues related to water resources management, and provides a comparative analysis of those issues. It elicits and discusses what it considers are the essential elements for a regulatory framework for water resources management, and identifies some emerging trends. (Size 0.9 MB) |
| Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems | Ashley C. Brown, Jon Stern, Bernard Tenenbaum and Defne Gencer | 6/1/2006 |
| World Bank publication |
| More than 200 new infrastructure regulators have been created around the world in the last 15 years. They were established to encourage clear and sustainable long-term economic and legal commitments by governments and investors to encourage new investment to benefit existing and new customers. There is now considerable evidence that both investors and consumers- the two groups that were supposed to have benefited from these new regulatory systems- have often been disappointed with their performance. The fundamental premise of this book is that regulatory systems can be successfully reformed only if there are independent, objective and public evaluations of their performance. (Available for purchase) |
| Regulatory Governance in Infrastructure Industries: Assessment and Measurement of Brazilian Regulators | Paulo Correa , Carlos Pereira, Bernardo Mueller , Marcus Melo | 4/30/2006 |
| World Bank publication |
| This paper assesses and measures regulatory governance in 21 infrastructure regulators in Brazil. Regulatory Governance is decomposed into four main attributes: autonomy; decision-rules; means and tools; and accountability. A ranking is proposed and the main areas for improvement identified. A comparison of the proposed regulatory governance index and other indexes internationally available is performed. ( Available for purchase) |
| Improving the Regulation of Water and Sanitation Services: Preliminary Review to Categorize, Describe and Assess Incentive Provisions in Management Contracts | Bill Hume Smith | 2/22/2006 |
| Paper prepared for the World Bank |
| This report categorizes, describes and assesses the different performance incentives that have been used in a selection of thirteen management contracts in the water supply and sanitation sector. The report discusses the distortionary effects of different performance measures. The variety of performance incentives outlined in this report demonstrates that practitioners developing contracts face substantial choices in designing incentives. A number of questions are highlighted in this report which, if answered, would be valuable for practitioners seeking to improve contract design. (Size 0.25MB) |
| Telecommunications performance, reforms, and governance | Antonio Estache, Ana Goicoechea and Marco Manacorda | 1/3/2006 |
| World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3822 |
| The authors assess the effects of private capital and independent regulatory agencies on telecommunications performance by using cross-country panel data from 1990 to 2003. In general, they find that having independent regulatory agencies positively affects affordability and labor productivity, but negatively affects quality. Having private capital positively affects access, quality, and labor productivity, but negatively affects affordability. However, reform policies affect industrial and developing countries differently in some cases. The authors also find that governance plays an important role as it affects performance and interacts with reform policies . (Size 0.34MB) |
| From Crisis to Stability in the Armenian Power Sector | Gevorg Sargsyan, Ani Balabanyan and Denzel Hankinson | 1/1/2006 |
| World Bank Working Paper 74 |
| The last fifteen years have seen Armenia emerge from Soviet rule and a severe economic and energy crisis, both complicated by its newfound political surroundings. The last ten years have seen significant reform and progress in the power sector which, when compared to the progress made by its neighbors, is all the more remarkable. The benefits of reform have not been easily won, however, and Armenia's success is a tribute to its ability to learn from mistakes and persevere. A combination of improper planning and bad fortune forced the Government of Armenia to go through three separate tenders for its privatization assets. A combination of good planning and good fortune ultimately allowed for what has turned out to be one of the region's most successful infrastructure privatizations so far. (Size: 0.96 MB) |
| Infrastructure concessions in Latin America : government-led renegotiations | J. Luis Guasch, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Stephane Straub | 10/07/2005 |
| World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3749. |
| The authors complement the existing knowledge in the renegotiation literature on infrastructure concessions by analyzing government-led renegotiations. While some of the main insights from the previous literature are unchanged, for example concerning the importance of having a regulator in place when awarding concessions and the fragility of price cap regulatory schemes, there are also significant differences as predicted by the model, in particular with respect to the effect of investment and financing, as well as the corruption variables. (Size 0.5MB) |
| Regulation and Competition: How Antitrust and Sector Regulation Affect Telecom Competition | Michel Kerf, Isabel Neto, and Damien Géradin | 6/01/2005 |
| World Bank Public Policy Journal Issue 296. |
| Countries with fully liberalized telecommunications markets have adopted different mixes of antitrust and sector-specific regulatory instruments. Does the balance between the two approaches matter for competitiveness? Drawing on the experiences of Australia, Chile, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, this Note finds that it does matter. Countries that get the balance right tend to have more competitive telecommunications markets. (Size 0.2 MB) |
| Interconnection Disputes: Antitrust or Sector Regulation and the Case of New Zealand | Michel Kerf, Isabel Neto, and Damien Géradin | 6/01/2005 |
| World Bank Public Policy Journal Issue 295. |
| Full liberalization of telecommunications markets provides scope for relying largely on general antitrust rules and institutions for economic regulation. But at least for a time after liberalization, sector-specific rules and institutions are likely to be needed in some areas, including interconnection. This Note draws lessons from the experience of New Zealand. After fully liberalizing its telecommunications market in the late 1980s, the country relied primarily on antitrust instruments to regulate interconnection until 2001, when it introduced a new regime putting heavier emphasis on sector-specific regulation. (Size 0.2 MB) |
| Controlling Market Power: Balancing Antitrust and Sector Regulation in Telecoms | Michel Kerf, Isabel Neto, and Damien Géradin | 6/01/2005 |
| World Bank Public Policy Journal Issue 294. |
| Among the countries fully liberalizing their telecommunications sector, some have chosen to rely mainly on sector-specific rules, often applied by sector-specific institutions, while others have depended on economywide antitrust rules and institutions to control market power. This Note describes the choices made by five notable reformers: Australia, Chile, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Drawing on their experiences, it then assesses whether antitrust or sector-specific processes have dealt more quickly and effectively with key regulatory issues. (Size 0.2 MB) |
| Consumer Participation in Infrastructure Regulation: Evidence from the East Asia and Pacific Region | Elisa Muzzini | 5/15/2005 |
| World Bank Working Paper 66 |
| Most East Asia and Pacific countries are in the process of reforming their infrastructure industries, focusing on strengthening the regulatory framework and making the investment climate more predictable. In this context, assessing the status of consumer participation in infrastructure regulation is essential to ascertain to what extent whether regulatory reforms in the region are supported by adequate mechanisms to safeguard consumer interests. (Size 0.4MB) |
| How Widespread were Private Investment and regulatory Reform in Infrastructure utilities during the 1990s? | Antonio Estache and Ana Goicoechea | 5/1/2005 |
| World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3595. |
| This note provides a snapshot as of 2004 of the share of countries with an independent regulatory agency and with at least some private sector financing of its sectoral investment needs for electricity, water and sanitation, and telecommunications. Among other things, they show that: For respectively, electricity, water and sanitation, and telecommunications, 51 percent, 21 percent, and 66 percent of the developing countries in the sample have an independent regulator. For respectively, electricity generation, electricity distribution, water and sanitation, and telecommunications, 47 percent, 36 percent, 35 percent, and 59 percent of the developing countries in the sample have at least some private sector financing. The shares of both agencies and private sector involvement tend to increase with income levels. (Size 0.31MB) |
| The Regulation of Utility Infrastructure and Services - An Annotated Reading List | Mark Jamison, Sanford Berg, Farid Gasmi and Jose Tavara | 4/1/2005 |
World Bank and PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility) |
| The purpose of this document is to identify a standard body of knowledge on utility regulation. It focused on basic principles and best practices that have developed over many years of regulation in some developed countries and more recently across the rest of the world. This document consists of an Annotated Reading List of the body of knowledge and narratives that identify key topics and themes – market structure and competition, financial analysis, regulating overall price level, tariff design, regulatory process, and quality, social and environmental issues. (Size 639KB) |
| How Concentrated are Global Infrastructure Markets? | Daniel Benitez and Antonio Estache | 3/6/2005 |
| World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3513. |
| The main purpose of this paper is to provide a first set of quantitative assessments of the degree of concentration in infrastructure at the global and at the regional level. The authors find no correlation between the degree of concentration and the degree of reform adopted by a region or a sector. In more general terms, they find no scope for simple encompassing regional or sectoral statements because issues are region- and sector-specific. They conclude by arguing that there are a few cases and regions in which it would make sense for a supranational competition or regulation agency to ensure that the interests of the users are protected more effectively against the risks of collusion and other types of anti-competitive behaviors local regulators would not be equipped to address. (Size 1.82MB) |
| Regulatory effectiveness : the impact of regulation and regulatory governance arrangements on electricity industry outcomes | Jon Stern and John Cubbin | 3/1/2005 |
| World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3536. |
| The authors review a number of studies on the effectiveness of utility regulatory agency and governance arrangements for the electricity industry, particularly for developing countries. They discuss governance criteria and their measurement, both legal frameworks and surveys of regulatory practice. They also discuss the results from econometric studies of effectiveness for regulatory agencies in the electricity and telecommunications industries and compare these with the results from econometric studies of independent central banks and their governance. The authors conclude with a discussion of policy implications and of priorities for information collection to improve understanding of these issues. (Size 4.13MB) |
| Optimal Size for Utilities? Returns to Scale in Water: Evidence from Benchmarking | Nicola Tynan and Bill Kingdom | 1/1/2005 |
| World Bank Group Public Policy for the Private Sector 283. |
| Using data from 270 water and sanitation providers, this Note investigates the relationship between a utility's size and its operating costs. The current trend toward transferring responsibility for providing services to the municipal level is driven in part by the assumption that this will make providers more responsive to customers' needs. But findings reported here suggest that smaller municipalities may face higher per-customer costs and could lower costs (and prices for consumers) by merging. (Size 0.12MB) |
| Infrastructure in East Asia and the Pacific - The Way Forward | John E. Besant-Jones |
