The crisis has gone a long way to unwinding— in an admittedly disorderly fashion—many of the tensions that precipitated it.
Sharply higher savings in the United States of the past several years, has greatly reduced the extent of the global imbalances (figure 1.13) that had been characterized by very high current-account deficits in the United States and surpluses elsewhere, notably in China.
The current-account deficit of the United States diminished to an estimated 3.5 percent of GDP in the first quarter of 2009, down from more than 6 percent during the course of 2007; and China’s trade surplus, though still very high, has also declined as a share of GDP.
Lower commodity prices have reduced current-account surpluses among oil exporters and deficits among importers (table 1.8).
The current-account balances of developing oil-exporting countries are projected to move from a surplus of 6.3 percent of GDP during the 2005–08 commodity boom to a surplus of 1.2 percent in 2009–10.
While the increase in U.S. savings and lower interest rates have contributed to the reduction in its current-account deficit, longer-term prospects for imbalances are less certain.
The very large monetary and fiscal stimulus that has been put in place will reduce overall savings (the sum of private and public saving) in the United States, especially if the authorities have difficulty in reversing the stimulus when the economy recovers.
Moreover, the monetary expansion has already regenerated the low interest rates that contributed to the excess liquidity in the first instance.
If too expansionary, these stimulus measures could regenerate very strong demand conditions and a return to low savings rates in the United States.

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