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World Bank Assistance for Financial Sector Reform

An IEG Evaluation
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Outcomes in financial sectors of countries that borrowed from the Bank are generally better than in countries that did not borrow for financial sector reforms. However, even in countries that borrowed, financial sectors remain relatively shallow and private sector access to credit remains low. Bank lending for reforms has not been enough to achieve the ultimate objective of well-developed financial systems.

 
Overview
 Download by Chapter

arrowExecutive Summary
arrowChapter 1. Introduction 
arrowChapter 2. What Constitutes Good Practice? 
Part I. Assessing Bank Assistance 
arrowChapter 3. Trends in Lending and Nonlending 
arrowChapter 4. Regional Patterns of Bank Assistance 
arrowChapter 5. Quality-at-Entry of Bank Assistance 

arrow

Chapter 6. Outcomes of Bank Loans and Credits 
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Chapter 7. Bank Support to Crisis Countries

Part II. Analyzing Results at the Country Level  
arrowChapter 8. Country-Level Outputs: Ownership 
arrowChapter 9. Country-Level Outputs: Incentives 
arrowChapter 10. Country-Level Outcomes: Market Structure, Contestability, Efficiency, and Health 
arrowChapter 11. Country-Level Impact: Financial Sector Depth and Stability 
arrow

Chapter 12. Findings and Recommendations

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 


 

 

 

 

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This volume focuses on Bank lending for financial sector reforms, including lending categorized both as being under the financial sector and as financial sector components of multisector loans. Most of the US$ 56 billion in lending (24 percent of total commitments) supported by the Bank between FY93 and FY03 was embedded in multisector loans. Apart from LOC, support for financial sector reforms has declined only slightly.

Financial sector outcomes in countries that borrowed from the Bank are generally significantly better than in countries that did not borrow from the Bank for financial sector reforms, with the former countries showing improvements in terms of the ownership of banks, efficiency measures, financial sector depth, and access to credit.

However, in most of the countries, the financial sectors remain relatively shallow, and private sector access to credit remains low. These findings suggest that although reforms supported by Bank lending during the past decade can be associated with improvements, they have not been sufficient to bring about the ultimate objective of well-developed financial systems.

These types of support are aimed at bank restructuring and privatization, strengthening prudential regulations and banking supervision, improving the regulatory and institutional framework for capital markets and insurance, and capacity building in specific financial intermediaries.

The coherence of the Bank's approach to financial sector reforms within a country and across countries has been weak at times. Other areas where there has been wide variation in Bank support and what seems an ad hoc approach to prioritization for Bank support, include payments systems, deposit insurance schemes, and capital market development.

The combination of ongoing debates within the Bank, an absence of "good policy" notes, and the decentralized nature of Bank operations have all contributed to a situation in which the Bank "speaks with many voices" on important matters of financial sector policy, a difference that cannot be fully explained by differences in country circumstances or the willingness to reform.

Findings and Recommendations  

 Recommendations

Findings:
  • Financial sector outcomes in countries that borrowed from the Bank for financial sector reforms are generally significantly better than in countries that did not. Nevertheless, in most of the countries, although the trend has been in the right direction, the financial sectors remain relatively shallow, and private sector access to credit remains low.

  • The objectives of financial sector lending followed good practices in the areas of reducing government ownership of financial intermediaries, improving prudential regulations to be consistent with international norms, and strengthening banking supervision to adhere more closely to international principles.

  • Consistency within a country and, especially, coherence of the Bank's approach to financial sector reforms across countries should be improved, particularly with respect to the priority of Bank support for payments systems, deposit insurance schemes, and capital market development.

  • The combination of ongoing debates within the Bank, absence of "good policy" notes, and the decentralized nature of Bank operations have all contributed to a situation in which the Bank "speaks with many voices" on important matters of financial sector policy.

  • The Bank was ill-prepared to respond quickly in the earlier crises in Mexico (1994); and in Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia (1997); but was better prepared in Argentina, Russia, and Turkey.

Recommendations:
  • The Bank's FSB should provide guidance for Bank staff and client countries, and the Financial Sector Network should become more proactive in the quality control of financial sector components in multisector loans. This involves producing good practice notes on a range of topics, in areas where there is a cohesive internal Bank view on reforms. In areas where debate continues, it needs to provide a review of issues and options for Bank support.

  • The Bank needs to focus assistance on (i) the process of preparing banks for privatization (financial restructuring) and ensuring that banks are sold to “fit and proper” owners; (ii) the implementation of laws and regulations governing the financial sector; (iii) strengthening supervision of financial intermediaries; and (iv) increasing access to credit by improving collateral laws, creditor rights, and providing technical assistance and training.

  • The Bank should develop monitorable indicators to assess progress on objectives, especially in the area of prudential regulations and supervision for financial intermediaries.

  • On support for countries prior to and following a crisis:

    - The Bank should develop a rating system, in partnership with other relevant institutions, for vulnerability to crises, making use of readily available information that can be used to engage countries in crisis prevention measures and issues in crisis response. The Bank should also do a better job than in the past of presenting assessments more candidly in documents.

    - The Bank should make internal arrangements to respond better to crises by developing guidelines, which should include the possibility, if circumstances warrant, of lending liquidity support to countries experiencing a crisis without stipulating ambitious reforms (which may not get realized) as justification for the loan.

    - Coordination with the IMF and other IFIs in crisis assistance needs to be improved, and at the outset of a crisis, the IFIs should reach quick agreement on the division of responsibilities among themselves.
Selected Figures

Evaluation Framework
fsr chart 1

 

Regional Concentration of Reforms

 

Total

AFR

 EAP

ECA

LAC

MNA

SAR

Number of loans with financial sector components

 280

 69

 29

 99

 59

 14

 10

 Percent of loans focused on reforms        
 - Regulation and legislation 

 43

 76

 71

 53

 64

 50

 - Supervision 

 33

 62

 54

 49

 50

 30

 - Restructuring and privatization 

 71

 72

 72

 61

 36

 90

 - Capital markets 

 14

 28

 18

 29

 50

 0

 - Insurance 

 22

 0

 8

 8

 36

 10

 - Payments system 

 14

 14

 21

 5

 21

 20


Breakdown of Operations with Financial Sector Components, by Sector Board (Including LOC)
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Note: Percentages do not add up to 100 owing to rounding of numbers.

 

Bank Concentrations in Countries That Borrowed for Financial Reforms, 1993-2001
 
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See also:  
loc cover x-small

World Bank Lending for Lines of Credit

                                

fsap cover x-smallFinancial Sector Assessment Program: IEG Review of the Joint World Bank and IMF Initiativesynthesis cover x-smallWorld Bank Assistance to the Financial Sector: A Synthesis of IEG Evaluations

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 




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