Complete Report [3.7 mb] English| Español |
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Executive Summary |
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Chapter 1: The Strategy for Pension Reform |
 | The Bank has been a leader in pension system reform. |
 | The Bank strategy supports a flexible, multi-pillar framework, under the appropriate macroeconomic, social, and financial conditions. |
 | The multi-pillar framework consists of a public unfunded pillar, a private funded pillar, and a voluntary pillar. |
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Chapter 2: The Bank's Support for Pension Reform |
 | Bank economic and sector work provides an extensive technical background on pension policy. |
 | Analysis of fiscal issues and private pension regulation has been thorough, but inadequate attention has been paid to income of the aged and ways to expand coverage. |
 | Both pay-as-you-go and multi-pillar pension systems supported by the Bank varied widely. |
 | Bank lending operations and nonlending work focused mainly on countries that implemented multi-pillar reforms. |
 | The majority of ratings for pension components and the projects overall were satisfactory. |
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Chapter 3: Quality at Entry for Pension Reforms |
 | The Bank supported PAYG reforms in many countries where initial conditions were inappropriate for multi-pillar reform. |
 | The Bank also supported multi-pillar reforms in a number of countries lacking macroeconomic stability, banking sector readiness, moderate indebtedness, and a low risk for corruption, which are necessary for a successful multi-pillar pension system. |
 | In some countries, the Bank did not fully consider all noncontributory options to expand the safety net to those outside the formal pension system. |
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Chapter 4: The Impact of Pension Reforms |
 | In many countries with multi-pillar systems, funded pillars were not well-diversified and remained open to political influence, contrary to theoretical precepts for a good multipillar system. |
 | Both multi-pillar and parametric reforms have helped improve fiscal sustainability, but the improvements are not sufficient for the long term. |
 | The secondary objectives of funded plans—to increase savings, develop capital markets, and improve labor market flexibility—have remained largely unrealized. |
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Chapter 5: Building Institutional Capacity |
 | The problems in Bank assistance in supporting pay-as-you go administration appear to be related to inadequate Bank and client supervision. |
 | Despite the success of the Bank’s pension simulation model (PROST), technical assistance has not been sufficient in developing local expertise. |
 | The Bank has made few loans to strengthen the regulatory environment. |
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Chapter 6: World Bank Coordination |
 | The Bank’s internal and external collaboration with other international agencies and with its client countries has affected the success of Bank-assisted reforms. |
 | Inconsistency in Bank policy often results from a lack of coordination among Bank sectors involved in pension reform. |
 | Relations with other donors have also weakened some outcomes. |
 | In its country relations, the Bank has not always effectively incorporated the concerns of all stakeholders involved in the process. |
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Chapter 7: Findings and Recommendations |
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Appendices: |
 | Appendix A: View on Pension Reform - A Brief Literature Survey |
 | Appendix B: Pension Systems in the World Bank-Assisted Countries |
 | Appendix C: Performance Ratings for Pension Projects |
 | Appendix D: Multi-Pillar Pension Systems, Transition Costs, and Savings |
 | Appendix E: Indicator Tables |
 | Appendix F: Reference Tables |
 | Appendix G: Selected World Bank Economic and Sector Work, by Region (Country-Specific) |
 | Appendix H: Management Response |
 | Appendix I: CODE Chairman's Summary |
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 | Endnotes |
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 | References |
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