Program of Seminars Partnerships to Combat Corruption: Rising to the Challenge September 17, 2006 Suntec Singapore Panelist(s): Paul Wolfowitz, President of the World Bank Group John Githongo, Senior Associate Member, St. Anthony’s College, United Kingdom Mohamed Ibrahim, Chairman, Celtel International B.V., The Netherlands Huguette Labelle, Chairwoman, Transparency International, Germany Nuhu Ribadu, Executive Chairman, The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigeria Paul Volcker, Chairman, Board of Trustees, The Group of Thirty Consultative Group, United States Moderator(s): Dele Olojede, Executive Chairman, Timbuktu Media, Plc, South Africa P R O C E E D I N G S MR. WOLFOWITZ: Good afternoon. We have an exciting group here to talk on this critical subject of "Partnerships to Combat Corruption." I would just like to say a few words of introduction, and then I plan to come down and join you and listen, because there is a lot to learn from this very distinguished group we have here. We have been having an intense discussion in the World Bank Group in recent months about how a sharper focus on governance should shape our work. We have released a paper with the title "Strengthening World Bank Group Engagement on Governance and Anti-Corruption," and that paper will be discussed tomorrow at the Development Committee meeting. The fact that governance and anti-corruption have risen high on the agenda of the World Bank reflects, I think, a worldwide recognition that better governance and reduced corruption are key to achieving the central mission of our organization--the reduction of poverty. We approach governance not as an end in itself but rather as a means to better development outcomes, and the evidence, I think, is quite clear that better governance is associated with more rapid growth and lower inequality, lower child mortality, lower literacy. Poor governance and its worst form, corruption, waste public resources meant for schools, for health clinics, for infrastructure, and in its most extreme forms, poor governance can lead to financial collapse and even societal instability. Our internal discussions have emphasized that governance improvement is a long-term process. There is no quick fix that can transform the governance environment overnight. Improvements take place over time. It is the trend that matters, and I think the experience of successful developed countries, many of whom have had extremely corrupt pasts--not that they are totally perfect now by any means--shows that, as does the successful decades-long effort to fight corruption here in Singapore, the host for our meetings. Secondly, the governance challenges differ significantly from country to country. There is no one-size-fits-all when it comes to this subject. The approach to reform has to be differentiated across countries and will be most successful when it supports countries' own efforts to address governance and corruption. Third, engagement and partnership are critical. Even in the most challenging environments, we are working to seek and engage with the champions of good governance and anti-corruption efforts. The most important of those champions may often be inside governments themselves, and we need to work them, but also more broadly, we need to work in partnership with other national stakeholders as well as with other donors, both multilateral and bilateral. Finally, to remember that corruption has at least two sides to it, that every corrupt transaction has bribe-givers as well as bribe-takers, and very often the bribe-givers come from developed countries. The developed countries have to do more to deal with that, and they also have to deal with the fact that often the gains, especially of large-scale corruption, are hidden away in banks in developed countries. We intend to engage more systematically at the global level to support efforts by developing countries to recover stolen assets. Let me stop here, because today we are here to listen to these outstanding panelists. It is a real privilege, because the governance issue is a complex one, and we have some real experts who can help enlighten us. Let me introduce them, and then I will turn the panel over to our chairman and moderator, who is Dele Olojede. He is Chairman of Timbuktu Media, a newspaper and magazine publishing company registered in Nigeria and South Africa. In April 2005, Mr. Olojede became the first African to win journalism's highest honor--maybe that's--excuse me--an American-centric comment--but any rate, one of the highest honors in journalism, the Pulitzer Prize, for his detailed reexamination of the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide. MR. WOLFOWITZ: He is all too familiar with the debilitating effect of corruption on development, and he has the authority to speak out and be heard. In 2006, The Financial Times named him "the most influential voice in the public arena in Nigeria," and as an advisor to business as well as government and international organizations, he uses that voice to push positive change. I don't think Paul Volcker needs an introduction from me, but let me do it anyway. His long and distinguished career has included most prominently a long and impressive tenure as Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve. He is currently helping us in the whole international financial community as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the International Accounting Standards Committee. He has shown strong leadership in the global fight against corruption, including his role as Chair of the Independent Inquiry into the United Nations Oil for Food Program, a role undertaken at the request of Secretary-General Kofi Annan. John Githongo is one of Africa's lead--and, I might add, bravest--anti-corruption advocates. Until his recent resignation, he was Kenya's first anti-corruption czar, aggressively investigating cases of large-scale corruption within the new government. Prior to that, Mr. Githongo was Executive Director of Transparency International in Kenya. He remains a powerful advocate of good governance and anti-corruption efforts across Africa. Huguette Labelle is currently Chancellor of the University of Ottawa and Vice President of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature. She joins us today in her capacity as a leading proponent of improved global governance and anti-corruption initiatives, signified by her serving on the Board of Directors of the United Nations Global Compact and, I would say, most significantly her key role as Chairperson of the Board of Transparency International. Mohamed Ibrahim, or Mo Ibrahim, as he is referred to at the IFC, where he is one of our good partners, is Chairman of Celtel International B.V. In building a major business which operates cellular networks in 14 African countries, he has 6.5 million customers and revenues of $1 billion. Mr. Ibrahim has had to join the battle against corruption first-hand, and we are delighted that he will share his advice and views on tackling corruption from the private sector perspective. Finally, but by no means least important, Nuhu Ribadu is leading the efforts of the Nigerian Government to tackle corruption in his role as Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission in Nigeria. He has demonstrated remarkable personal leadership in the fight against crime and corruption and has been recognized with several awards as a police officer, prosecutor and the Chairman of the FCC, where he is a strong figure for national anti-corruption efforts. I hope he doesn't mind if I tell this on him--when I was in Nigeria in July, he was part of a team briefing me on the impressive efforts of the Nigerian economic team, and after he described some of his work, I said, "Isn't it dangerous?" and he said in a matter of fact way, "Well, yes. Two of my people have been murdered." He is conducting himself at great personal risk, and I commend his courage in the face of real threats. It is a difficult subject, it is a challenging subject, but it is a critically important subject, and I thank all of you. Now, Mr.--if I may call you Dele--please take over. Thank you. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you. Can everyone hear me? All right. Thank you, everyone, for coming. To simplify the process, I have just made a slight adjustment to our program. I am going to ask our panelists to make brief statement to open the session before I invite Frannie and Michael from the World Bank and the IFC to pose some general questions, and then we'll take it from there. We fully intend to involve the audience directly in this conversation. We want it to be a conversation, so we are going to try to make time available to you to ask questions and to make brief comments as you see fit on this very interesting subject. So, Paul, if you would lead us off by making an opening statement of what your thinking is with regard to the subject at hand. MR. VOLCKER: Well, let me say I hadn't really expected at my advanced age to be at a World Bank meeting in Singapore, talking about corruption. But the truth of the matter is that my interest has been sharpened by my recent experience with investigating the UN's Oil for Food Program. It seems to me a prime example of good intentions being thwarted by corruption, and that corruption not only limited the success of that program, but it raised, as you know, very real questions about the competence of the UN organization. And I would emphasize that without a percent of confidence in the organization, or any organization, it is difficult to maintain support and legitimacy. That concern has been reinforced in the last few days by the tragic event in Moscow. Andrei Koslow was a brave young man on a patriotic mission to restore a sense of integrity and confidence in Russian banking. It must have been a lonely effort. His murder is a dramatic reflection of the corrupt forces resisting governance reform. So, yes, I do think this is a crucial matter. The battle is joined. It has real implications for the World Bank Group and its lending. And I do want to concentrate just for a few minutes on the World Bank responsibilities in particular. The preface to that is that I think it is now generally recognized and accepted that corruption is a major obstacle, and in some countries, the major obstacle, to effective economic development. The simple fact is that that has been increasingly recognized by the World Bank itself, and in that light, let me just say right off the bat that it is fatuous to suggest that a serious attack on corruption in borrowing countries, including in the last analysis a threat or the actuality of denying loans, is somehow inconsistent with supporting the development goals of the World Bank Group. The contrary is much more likely. Failure to deal with corruption undercuts development. It will limit, more likely more than offset, any value added in new lending. Now, that's awfully easy for me to say. What is difficult, what is practical and difficult, is how to do about it, how to be effective in combating corruption. And I am in a position, happily, of having colleagues up here with years of experience in this area that will be able to explain more fully how to implement my general prescription. I do think that this session and the questions that have been posed to us emphasize the potential of partnership. But I think my main point will be something different--that the key to dealing with corruption will be leadership, leadership certainly in the multilateral institutions, but in lending countries and in borrowing countries and in private companies and in NGOs. The message really needs to come from the top. It has to infuse the culture of all the organizations, public and private, concerned. As I thought about it, I thought a reasonable starting point might be to take a leaf from Nancy Reagan, with her old anti-drug slogan--"Just Say No." After all, corruption is a kind of addictive drug, and I know that some companies enforce that approach, but I also know that slogans aren't enough. Private companies, public institutions, NGOs, I suspect can do more by in effect making that kind of pledge publicly and jointly, in particular countries or more generally. They should have a common approach toward conflicts of interest, financial reporting, ethical standards, and transparency--all that helps as part of good corporate and public governance. But still, I am not so naive as to think that a plea for voluntary cooperation by itself is going to do the job. It seems to me entirely legitimate that with respect to individual loans, that the Bank be assured that really effective independent oversight and auditing arrangements are in place. I know that in general that has been the intent in the past, but my sense is that it may need to be toughened up, and particularly when experience has been that a particular country will require strong Bank oversight. I think it also implies a strong internal Bank inspection function, and it does seem to me that we have reached a point where that inspection function has to be thought of not as an unwanted addendum to the Bank but as an integral part of the Bank and the Bank Group, right up there with the lending function itself. Now, of course, that kind of thing is intrusive, but I see no real question of national sovereignty involved. That seems to me a false hair. We are talking about voluntary lending programs, and if corruption is found, and remedial action by governments and businesses falls short, then, suspension of lending programs is certainly justified. The more difficult case is when the concern is not confined to a particular loan but when the country and its government are broadly and deeply corrupted, embedded in longstanding traditions and culture. Then, maybe a different approach at the start is needed--consultation, step-by-step criteria for change, maybe the indicated course. But again, in the end, if there is recalcitrance or progress isn't made, disbarment may be the natural and needed choice. Now, those are very general statements. The policies need to be more concrete. I think it would be very helpful if they were spelled out in program guidelines in the Bank. And this is an area, it seems to me, that calls out for consultation and partnership with private parties and NGOs. And I understand there are models to be followed. In the past, there was interesting improvement in Hong Kong in that area. Right now, I understand that Dubai, which has not had the clearest reputation for transparency and forwardness, has been working very hard experimenting with an international financial area with the highest standards, anti-corruption and otherwise. But I'm getting ahead of the discussion. Let me just conclude with a simple declaration of faith. The greatest threat to development and, ultimately, to the Bank itself would be to sit back and be passive in the face of this challenge. To take the view that its job is to lend freely whenever a perception of marginal benefit seems to justify it is not the right approach. Then, I think support for the institution and the effectiveness of its programs is sure to erode over time. My impression is that the corruption problem may be getting worse. It needs priority attention--attention by the Bank and elsewhere. I know of no institution, by its leadership, by its professional staff, by its standing in the world, that should be better-equipped to take on that challenge. Thank you very much. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you, Paul. The New York Times told us a couple of days ago that even the rather modest efforts that Paul Wolfowitz has been making within the Bank itself have been meeting with some resistance--hopefully, not as much resistance as people like Nuhu Ribadu faced--at least, Paul, to my knowledge, no one is threatening to kill him. So, Nuhu, if you would give us some of your thoughts on this. MR. RIBADU: I thought I was going to come last. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Olojede. Let me start by thanking the President, Mr. Wolfowitz, for inviting me. Thank you very much. You came to Nigeria, and you listened to us, and we thought it was important that we should come--the foot soldiers who are involved or directly engaged in the fight against corruption and the establishment of good governance in developing countries, the countries that suffer as a result of corruption, who are really at the receiving end of all the bad things we are talking about. And I think it is important--it is great--that we can see a changed world, really. The fact that I could get an opportunity to talk to you itself is a new development, and we thank good leadership like you are giving, Mr. President. Well, I am here to just share with you our experience, what is going on in Nigeria, and tell you that probably the biggest challenge facing the world development is corruption. \When I talk of corruption, I'm talking about mismanagement, incompetence, abuse of office, not doing things properly and correctly, inability to establish justice and fairness, not doing this properly and correctly--and that is the only difference between the developed countries and the developing ones. We know what corruption is doing to us. We know what corruption has cost us--it has denied us the value of our resources, both human and natural. It breeds injustice. It causes killings, the diseases that ravage us almost everywhere. It turns us into a country of people who live on the kindness of others and we are very angry. This is not what we want, and this is not what we are going to allow to continue. Some of us are saying "Enough is enough." I am talking about corruption today. It is we, those who are at the receiving end, who are calling for a change--change, first of all, in how we run our affairs, how we manage our affairs, and then also, change in the world--let the world listen to it--hopefully will help--not giving us charity but, rather, to help us address some of these fundamental problems. We do get some not really happy people to see, then, that the world is calling for how to help us, to feed us, calling for making poverty history. Daily, every day, you open the television, you see horrible pictures coming from us. We think that it cannot just continue like that. We are tired of living on the kindness of others. The only way we can change this is also if we can do very well like the rest of the world, and we are talking about management. There is no difference between us and the rest of the world. Instead of making poverty history, we should make mismanagement and corruption history, and we will set ourselves-- MR. RIBADU: And it is happening in Nigeria today. I can tell you that and assure you that in this short period of time, two or three years, we have set up the reforms in Nigeria. We have turned Nigeria into a country at the head of the war against corruption. We are already seeing some changes. We are seeing the benefits of it. For you to do that, first and foremost, you have to get good leadership--a homegrown program, people who believe that you have to change. And I think we are lucky today that we have good leadership in the country, leadership that is fairly transparent and open, leadership that allows this kind of work to go on, leadership that is ready to take and confront the problem. After that, some of the problems facing us have to be addressed through law enforcement. This is extremely, extremely important, because lack of law and order and rule of law is the cause of all this. Where you have rules, where you have law, chances are this will be done properly and correctly. In Nigeria, what we did was to come up with a program to ensure that we establish rule of law, first and foremost, do things properly and correctly, and through that, we can fight the corruption that we are talking about. I am the one who is heading the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. It is just three years old, but when we started, we said that we were going to address this problem. How do we go about it? First and foremost, we said that we were going to go after the bad people who are responsible for some of the bad things that happened to us--we would bring them to justice. We showed the world that in Nigeria, there is going to be rule of law, and that nobody is going to be above the law again. Today, we have recorded about 82 convictions in a country that never had one before the coming of these reforms. Within this short period of time, we have recovered over $5 billion. It may not be important, but it is very, very significant--it is showing a change and giving us a new direction. It is showing that we can do it ourselves. It is not something that is coming from the outside; there is nobody imposing it on us, but we are asking for people to understand and to come and help us. The nature of corruption itself, a country cannot address it alone; it has to get support from outside. And we are fairly lucky that since there are changes in the world--maybe September 11 changed the world--maybe September 11 has let small, poor countries like Nigeria to take advantage of it. As a result of it, we have the new anti-money laundering law. As a result of it, we have an FI, Financial Intelligence Unit, that talks with the rest of the FIs in the world. As a result of it, the world is coming to look critically at the finances. As a result of it, those who stole money from the poor countries of Africa and the rest of the poor countries are finding it difficult to have safe haven where they are going go keep this money. It is helping us in addressing the problem locally at home. In Nigeria, we had a leader who took $6 billion from the country and took it outside; most of the money was kept in the Western world, in the finance sector of the world. Today, maybe 80 percent of the grand corruption that takes place in Africa goes out, is kept somewhere. We are working, and we have been able to establish very good linkages with law enforcement agencies all over the world, with the metropolitan police, and I want to seize the opportunity to thank them extremely, extremely, because they helped us by coming after those people who stole this money and are keeping it. They are helping us to address the problem locally and internally. We are working with the FBI, BK of Germany, Interpol, and so on, and it is making a difference. I hope--hope--that we are going to get more of this support from international bodies like the World Bank, the IMF. The World Bank is one of the first agencies in the world that came up and supported us. They gave us $5 million, and that $5 million they gave us in two years made a massive difference in the country, because it came at a time when we were going after members of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate. The number three person in Nigeria, we brought to justice, as a result of which we were threatened. We probably would not have gotten some money. Eventually, we did, but the money came in very handy. Today, we are fighting literally every big person. We have brought ministers to justice. We have brought the chief law officer to justice. We have governors in Nigeria imprisoned. We have almost all the powerful ones. We will not survive until we get the support of the outside. The battle, the war, is going on the ground in Nigeria. But we are small, tiny. We may not really see success until and unless, of course, we get the support. I think that's an introduction. Let me just stop there. Thank you. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you, Nuhu. Thank you very much. MR. OLOJEDE: Nuhu has just taken us through what it feels like to be, as the miners say in South Africa, "at the coalface." One of the things that has come through these introductory remarks is the idea of collaboration, and who is better-placed than Huguette Labelle to take us through that, from your vantage position as head of Transparency International. MS. LABELLE: Thank you very much.It's great that all of you are here this afternoon and therefore recognize this as a very, very central problem of our day. I like very much your point of making corruption history. This is something we must keep in mind. Let me illustrate by one example a number of points that I want to make. Our National Chapter in Senegal, the Transparency International Chapter, decided in talking to their colleagues in civil society that the whole field of health and health delivery in that country was a significant problem and had a significant corruption problem. With the support of the Ministry of Health and the support of the President's office, and the support of a major bilateral donor, they undertook a very extensive and intensive study of the health delivery system in that country--20 researchers working for nine months in over 20 health institutions, clinics, hospitals, regional health units, Ministry of Health at the national level, local governments and what they came up with was a very, very interesting story as to not only was money leaking out of the system at all levels, right to the front again. What they saw in those institutions was vaccines and antibiotics being diluted or replaced by water so that the effective agents could be sold; they saw some of the medications sold to street vendors who then--you might come with chest pain, and they would say, "Let me see" and pull out a box which could have been aspirins or something else. They saw how medical doctors in certain situations were directing patients who would come to a public clinic into their private clinic. They saw people who had to be turned away because they could not pay the bribe that was asked when they brought a very sick child to a clinic. And--much more--they saw equipment manufacturers coming and bribing extensively to have their equipment bought, which meant that a much smaller quantity of equipment could be bought, whether x-ray machines or otherwise. So the interesting part is not so much that this was a detailed study of the health system in that country it’s what happened after; and Transparency International of Senegal was able, with the support of the government of that country, to bring together all the people that needed to be part of the solution to get very extensive debriefings. And at first they were extremely resistant, these were the doctors, they were the nurses, the pharmacists, the drug companies, they were the equipment providers. But the users of the system were also there, those that had been patients. You also had, of course, the Ministry of Health people. What happened is that this group of people from civil society, professional organizations, providers and so on, eventually agreed that this could not continue; that together they would try to fix this situation, find ways of preventing it. They asked our chapter not only to facilitate the process but to monitor its implementation over time. What did we learn there? We learned that you need to have all the right people around the same table. That civil society had a very important role to play: the providers and so on. We also learned that you need to get at the real data. Paul Volcker and his commission was part of getting at that. It’s hard to solve a problem if you don’t know what it really is. You needed the leadership and the support and the will of the government of that country for that to really happen. Of course, you needed the people to agree to work in a sustained basis. You needed to relook at your financial system and at your justice system to…. that it was effective in dealing with those situations. And of course, transparency kept coming back to the fore; transparency into budget allocation, all the way to the front line, to prevent those leakages. I’ve certainly had experience and seen where that happens. That it is a tremendous deterrent for those leakages to happen therefore, that was the key. Obviously, partnership there was vital, the support of the donor community was vital as well, it all was part of the whole. I think what we found out too is that you can work at the national level--which is important--but eventually you need to start looking at sectoral programs, whether it’s customs, or whether it’s education, or health, or others. Otherwise, you don’t get at those imbedded systems, which this was able to demonstrate. Let me just make a few other points beyond this I think that the very sad murder that happened a few days ago in Russia demonstrates that corruption kills. Not only does it kill because people do not have the services that they should have because money is out somewhere else that should go to development. Not only does it kill because when the service is available, people can’t pay the bribes that are very often asked for its delivery. But it also kills in a very different way, money that is siphoned off into fiscal havens, laundered in a variety of ways, comes back either through the drug trade, through illicit weapons trade, comes back into the country to buy votes, and we could go on. The forces that are there to try to ensure that these things continue are very strong. Without the partnering of all the key people that has a stake in solving it, we won’t solve it. If I just look at this money laundering situation you were pointing out, basically you need the regulators, you need the central banks, Paul, you need the major banks, the major investment firms, you need the accounting area, you absolutely need the security services, and many more. But unless we find ways of getting around these major problems of our society, the right people around the same table working in full partnership, it won’t work. This is why, Paul Wolfowitz, we welcome the strategy that you’re proposing, because to us it’s part of that solution. And hope that it’s implementation will include all the people in society that need to be involved in finding the right solutions at all levels: internationally, nationally, and locally. Thank you. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you. Thank you, Huguette. I will now go to Mo, Mo Ibrahim, who funded and runs a company, telecom company called Celtel, which basically focused on how the rough neighborhoods we’ve been talking about. He, in particular, takes Paul Volcker’s injunction to heart, which is, just say no. I invite him to tell us how easy it has been to operate in these countries on the principle of just saying no to all kinds of corrupt demands and inducements. MR. IBRAHIM: Thank you. Thank you very much, and I’m glad to be here. So just essentially, I’m going to tell you a story about how we went about to build a business in sub-Sahara Africa, which is supposed to be one of the most difficult areas according to your reports. It was about ‘98 when we founded Celtel. I come from the mobile industry, I’m an engineer, civil engineer, etcetera, designed a system in U.K. I was executive director with BT, and then I started my own company: MSI. We design most of the cell systems in Europe actually, we made a lot of money with this company; sold it for $1 billion, so I had some money. But what happened is, around that time I looked around, there were tremendous activities among telecom companies to acquire assets in Europe and here in Asia, at extremely high prices--sell our assets, I mean, mobile communications. And nobody was interested in Africa, I remember once I was talking to the senior executive from Bell Company in U.S., a board member, and I told him, “Look, Uganda, we received a request from them to build a cellular network, so we would like to come and to do that.” And he said, “You crazy. I mean, you want me to go to that country run by terrible called Idi Amin?” I said, “John, Idi Amin left 15 years ago.” MR. IBRAHIM: I said, “Actually, this proves my point.” I am the most enlightened man on my board. Maybe I’m the only guy with a passport. If I think Idi Amin is still there, what do you think the rest of my company-- MR. IBRAHIM: You think Ugandans still live up in the trees.I’m an African, I’m a Nubian, which is very old African race one of the oldest African races. I always have quarrels with the Zulus, but we think we’re older than them. That’s another issue. Really, it helped me a lot, because I know Africa. And yes, things are not perfect in Africa. But the picture or the image of Africa abroad is really much worse than reality. So that person said, “Look, we will go and build mobile communications in Africa.” At that time nobody wanted to touch Africa at all. So I started Celtel and everybody said, you are crazy. How are you going to deal with bribes, corruption? You are going to lose your shirt over there. So what we have done actually is very simple, which I would like to share with you. First, I got a fantastic board in my company. Of course, it’s a company; it’s a business, so we had the right business and telecom people. I remember I had Sir Went, the man who founded Vodaphone, chief executive of Vodaphone was at my board, deputy chairman. I got deputy chief executive of British Telecom--the right telecom people were in my board. But then I went, I got people like Lord Pryor, who is a very senior minister with Margaret Thatcher, very special figure. Got Salim Ahmed Salim, who just stepped down from the--was Secretary General African Union, who’s South Africa. This was statesmen of the board. Then the World Bank IFC wanted to put some investment in our company and we said, “Look, if you want to put money, you need to give us a director on the board.” They said, “No, no, no, no, no, we don’t put people on the boards because of conflicts.” I said, “No conflicts. If there are any issues, we can walk out of the room. Conflict, we don’t want any.” But we need what are called corruption repellents, so we got a senior director from the IFC in our board. Then CDC, which is the British government, sent a director to us, [they] invested, but also put a director there. (Inaudible) from Holland, DEG from Germany. We had a wonderful board here. Had a board of 12 people; very eminent people. Maybe I’m the lesser person on those, and I had to chair those guys in board meeting. So it’s better thought for me to stuff. Anyway, that’s how one of the things we put in place to get really a powerful board. Then we put out a very strong message from day one we said, not a single dollar was given away. Can you spell that? Not a single dollar would--repeat after me--not a single dollar. Say, “Okay, then he signed his employment contract.” He joined the company. It’s a matter of culture we need to create a culture in the company say, “Look, we’re very good in our business we’re some of the best telecom people around, we know that. But we’re also very honest people, we’re going to do business cleanly.” That is very important. So that is how we started our business. To our surprise, it was very easy actually, our assumption that those crocodiles sitting out there waiting to swallow us the moment we land at the airport actually were not there. I start to ask the question, I said, “Is it possible that we, the business people, are actually the guys who create corruption? Could it be us who’s begetting that?” We land in a country. Usually it is not a very nice capital compared to where we came from. The food is not fantastic, the hotel is bad, and you are missing your baseball game, and your wife phoning, when you going to be back for the weekend, and you try to cut corner. You think are cutting corners by stuffing a brown envelope in somebody’s pocket to go home in time. So that’s food for thought, because genuinely we had really little problems in the countries. It doesn’t say things were always smooth. Three times went to court and we won every single case, to our surprise. And our board people said, “Courts work in Africa. Can you believe that?” It works. We won our three cases in court in Africa. We got under pressure sometimes but we stand. Obviously, okay, do you want something? Fine. I’m going to take your request to my board, and I’ll come back to you because what we’re a BV company. Our board has really--it’s true--has full executive power actually, by law. So I cannot sign check for you. I’m going to take your request to the board, and sit down. Said, “okay.” MR. IBRAHIM: What we did also was to really engage the society. So we say, “Look, Mr. President, we’re going to build a wonderful medical center here. And why don’t you call it your wife’s name or your daughter’s name? Great, And you come and open it, you get a lot of credit for that.” We dig a well here, we do something here. So we have really a lot of social commitments, and we don’t care what you call it at the end as long as it is for the people. And that how we dealt with this. As a result of that, we managed to--I arranged to have a map here. The IT people said--promised to put a map and they forgot, obviously. SPEAKER: I think there it is. MR. IBRAHIM: Right. Now look at these countries we are working in. We work--I think we need to update the information that Paul gave to you. We have 17 million customers in 15 countries, all of them in sub-Sahara country. And according to your people actually, the top country in your list here is Burkina Faso, is number 70. Most of our countries actually are in the hundreds. And we have the owner--actually, the last country is one of our countries, Chad. (Inaudible.) So we did operate in some of the most difficult places. But as I said, by making a stand from the outset, people knows, nobody will come to you. The problem, you feel generous, you want to go and stuff money in the pockets, et cetera. Fine, people will take your money. But it is stupid. And I’m talking to our business colleagues around here. Bribes erodes your margin. When you start to pay, it will never stop. You give the minister of telecom, then there is a regulator, then there is the finance telecom, then there’s a prime minister, then there’s a president. And guess what, next year you have a different finance minister, different-- MR. IBRAHIM: It never ends. Really. It never ends. It erodes, really erodes your margins. Something else, it is a quality of your company, the value of your company. We were taking our company public last year, and we were inundated with offers. A lot of companies wanted to buy us, because everybody knew was squeaky clean, there’s no skeletons it’s so easy for them to do due diligence on us. As a result, we ended up selling the company for $3.4 billion, do you know what you mean $3.4 billion? Total investment was $400 million. That’s an average return of eight times. Eight times average of return for our shareholders. Why? Because the company was squeaky clean, successful and squeaky clean. That creates value for our business. So if you go and do hanky-panky, you end up really with problem. Who wants to invest in your company with all these skeletons? So really from a very pure, leave alone, the moral--I give you all the moral. Just from a selfish point of view as a businessman, you want to create value? You want to improve your bottom line? Really just do clean business; it is quite possible. Second thought I want to leave you with is that bribery really and corruption is a crime committed by two consenting adults, just like adultery. MR. IBRAHIM: Just like adultery, the woman also always gets the blame, actually, the man brag about it. I think in the relationship between business and government there’s a lot of similarity here. We hear a lot about corruption in Africa and I ask, “Who’s the partner? Who’s the other guy?” United States get the Foley Corruption Act some years ago which is quite commendable. You did very well. Europe was very lagging behind, and actually until few years ago bribery was illegal activity; it was tax deductible, are you aware of that? The same guy who’s standing on their soapboxes lecturing us about--saying bribery, to the companies, bribery’s okay, actually, I offer you taxes. So we need less hypocrisy. If you want to enforce the law, the law must be enforced in Wagadugu (ph.), in Paris, in London, and also in Washington. We need to see prosecution. MR. IBRAHIM: Thank you. I think I better (inaudible.) MR. IBRAHIM: Thank you. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you, Mo. Thank you very much. Now we have another consenting adult to talk to. John Githongo is catching his breath at Oxford at the moment, having gone through the fire that Nuhu is going through at the moment, and also brings some interesting perspectives on the subject at hand. John? MR. GITHONGO: Thank you very much, Dele.I think I agree with so much of what has already been said so it’s actually quite easy for me to round up. I’ve only got three comments. One, taking off on just something that Mr. Ibrahim touched on, and focusing very much on basically my own experience and subsequent work I have come to discover you’re very right, that actually it’s a partnership when you’re talking about corruption. One of the fascinations for me has been the fact that we’ve imbedded corruption networks that include four different types of players: the politicians. And the irony is that the politicians change but the imbedded network remains the same. You have bureaucrats, who are also essential to these networks. Those ones don’t change that often. I’ve even come across situations where bureaucrats will refuse promotion in particular departments because they want to remain in charge of particular situations. Very, very key to these networks, and here I’m talking about cases of grand corruption in three sectors in particular. One less than the other, but three--is extractive industries, whether it’s oil or diamonds or anything you’re digging from the ground that has high value. Extractive industries, security/defense, and communication. Communication a lot less now. All these sectors which involve very opaque procurement practices. As I said, politicians, bureaucrats, not necessarily at the top levels, sometimes middle level bureaucrats who wield a great deal of power and may even refuse movement upwards. Thirdly, very important, always in the shadows but absolutely key to these relationships are security sector officials -, be they intelligence, police, or military. They’re absolutely key to these networks. And finally, we have businessmen/brokers. I don’t call them businessmen from the same sense that you do business. They’re really people with briefcases with the capacity to put together the architecture of financial instruments and entities that are used to extract resources from Africa. They’re able to fly from a capital city in Africa to Luxembourg or wherever, and open bank accounts, and set up dummy companies, et cetera, and facilitate these transactions. So it’s not really a business person in the real sense of the word, it’s a briefcase moving around, I’m sure you’ve bumped into them as you try going around your business. Two key issues help to address--tracking these networks is key, and that’s beginning. The kind of work that Nuhu is doing of simply picking up some of these characters and putting them away. But it comes down to rule of law, just as Nuhu focused on. But ultimately, also, executive accountability. Accountability on the part of the people who are at the top of the governance structure of a nation. That’s absolutely key. The second point I wanted to touch on is the debate there has been with regard to corruption that almost tends toward--this is a question that I’ve been challenged with--but isn’t there a trade-off between anti-corruption and anti-poverty? That you focus too much on the fight against corruption and it interrupts the war against poverty. My own experience is the best factory for producing poverty is corruption. It is the most efficient machine of producing, not only poverty, but inequality. And it leads to a situation, particularly governance institutions are weak. I think, Nuhu, you experienced this quite directly, where you can have economic growth, but when the governance institutions are weak that growth leads to resources being allocated unequally. Leads to inequality, which then has a political expression; in some countries even ethnic and religious expression, which then affects the conducts and the way people vote, and it leads to political problems which can sometimes appear more intractable than they actually are. It’s a side effect of corruption which I think is sometimes underrated, and it structurally affects the ability of governments to implement policies aimed at reducing poverty. I shall not say much more. I think a lot has already been said. I’m sure there are going to be questions asked and that will give me an opportunity to be able to answer some more questions. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you very much, John Githongo. We are going to keep this moving along fairly briskly, and to lead off with a number of questions I’m going to ask Michael Klein, who’s the vice president, chief economist of the IFC, the International Finance Corporation, to come to the podium and put some questions to our panel. Michael? MR. KLEIN: Thank you. I guess I’m here to make sure that the politically contentious and somewhat incorrect questions are asked, which I’ll ask two of them. Number one, very soon we will come out with a report in the World Bank that tracks poverty in Bangladesh. The household survey in which this is based will show, as the analysis shows so far, that poverty is being reduced very rapidly in that country. At the same time, in the rankings, perception rankings about corruption, Bangladesh is way at the bottom. So what does that mean? How do we think about that? What does it mean for engagement strategy of the World Bank Group? That’s question one. The second one, in the Doing Business report that we issue now for the fourth time we document that there are a whole lot of rules in some countries, and the more complicated rules the poorer the country, which push people into the informal sector. At the extreme, there are about a dozen countries where the taxes that businesses, certain types of businesses have to pay, would exhaust all profit if they were actually paid, because it’s physically impossible to actually stick to those rules. So that then means that a lot of people go into the informal sector and have to avoid the rules because they’ve got to do something. They’re not foreigners. These are locals. They don’t have a choice of staying away from the country. And then that makes them even more vulnerable to officials who come to them and say, “We know you’re not following the rules, and please pay us.” And then they do pay. At the same time, these are very poor people. These are victims of a system of rules, but they do pay at times. And at the same time, we try to help, for example, with microfinance operations. So maybe we don’t worry about providing microcredits indirectly or directly to people who are forced by the systems into bribery. But as we go up the ladder, larger companies also are suffering from rules that may not be good. When does it stop? When do we think the consenting party, or one of the consenting adults is actually guilty and no longer a victim? And how do we deal engagement-wise with all of this? What does this mean? How do we think about that? MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you, Michael. I’ll take a couple more questions from Frannie Leautier. Frannie is the vice president of the World Bank Institute and one of the chief organizers of this conference, so this is actually sort of bribery (inaudible.) MR. LEAUTIER: Thank you very much, Dele. I don’t have many questions; I have two. One is, all of you as panelists have shown a degree of leadership in taking up the issue of corruption in your various roles, and it’s a dangerous business. So a question to you as panelists is, what advice do you have to grow leaders who will step up and do what you’re doing, and how do you protect them or protect yourselves? So that’s one question. The second question is, all of you in your descriptions or opening remarks talked about the importance of having partnerships between the private sector, the public sector, civil society. How do you avoid capture and complicity, and how do you make those partnerships sustainable in the long run? Thank you. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you, Frannie.I’ll ask Paul Volcker to perhaps tackle the first one regarding Bangladesh where you have, by all accounts, one of the world’s most corrupt countries, where things don’t work very well. At the same time, because it’s been experiencing economic growth you see human development indices kind of improving somewhat dramatically. Is that enough of an explanation for perhaps why people shouldn’t focus too much on corruption when discussing Bangladesh? MR. VOLCKER: When you say with respect to Bangladesh, a particular country, sir, I thought I came here to give policy advice. MR. OLOJEDE: You did. MR. VOLCKER: That’s an operating detail. MR. OLEJEDE: We’re using that to extrapolate. MR. VOLCKER: What I would do, just as a matter of general approach, whether it’s Bangladesh or not, you may be receiving few comments, but I will go to the expert staff of World Bank that has dealt with whatever the country is. I happen to have a very colorful summary that was given me from the staff, and I looked up Bangladesh, and it’s not the worst country on the list but it’s not very good, I agree. It’s down there at the bottom. And it certainly raises the question. It’s bad enough–-I don’t know anything about the history–-but if it’s not only as corrupt as Michael was suggesting but it shows no inclination to reform, and I have tried to counsel it with my best counseling over a few years, I wouldn’t lend them money. SPEAKER: I think you need Paul Volcker. MR. OLOJEDE: I really think the answer there Michael, is straightforward. This will not continue. History teaches us it’s unsustainable. Look at Indonesia. Everybody was blazing to the sky the Asian Tigers, turning a blind eye to corruption and what happened. Everybody was in pain after that. So it will not end well. We should not just look at transient situations. Let’s have really a wider look. It doesn’t pay. MR. KLEIN: Be careful. I’m going to Indonesia in a couple of days, so I may get asked. MR. OLOJEDE: Just to stay one last time on this particular question, is there some sense that perhaps the progress that they’re seeing in Bangladesh has been showcased in some way as a result of what President Bush used in a different context called the “soft bigotry of low expectations,” like, “Oh, yeah, this is an improvement. This is good enough for Bangladesh.” Because some of us might argue that if they are reforming and have minimal corruption that they would in fact have seen an exponentially more improved environment than what they currently have. SPEAKER: I would go with my colleague here and say that if corruption remains that the economic growth and growth with equity and stability in the society will not continue over time and that any country would be very wise to attack corruption as opposed to just turn a blind eye and say we’re doing well economically, therefore we don’t have to worry about this. And if you look at Bangladesh, which is really the Mecca of micro-enterprises, you have three major micro-enterprises there, BRAC, PROSECA, and Grameen Bank, and if one were to take these three in a sense NGOs away, the services to the people in terms of health, education and access to credit would be very low, so I think that Bangladesh needs to continue to be encouraged very strongly to deal with some of the issues that are still there, and hopefully that’s what they want to do with themselves. MR. OLOJEDE: Nuhu, would you address Michael’s second question, which is basically if there are bad rules in a place, is a measure of corruption justifiable? One example might be if the taxes are extortionate in some countries the tax is almost 100 percent of your net revenue, would a business be justified where there are demonstrably bad rules to avoid, cut corners, and find ways around those rules? MR. RIBADU: Well, maybe I should just put the two together with the question on Bangladesh. We are all going to develop eventually, whether anybody likes it or not. It’s just a matter of time. And what is important is the process, how do you fast-track it, how do you immediately address your problems and get solutions. Bangladesh will have done better if there was less corruption, definitely. It will have probably achieved more or better without corruption, so the fact that it is moving, developing, and still there is corruption shows that it is really not realizing its full potential. This is just a fact, really. Some countries suffer more than others, but there is no doubt about it. Where you have a system that compromises, where you have a system that addresses selfish interests against the common interests, you should change, no doubt about it. So talking about rules, if there are bad rules, change them, and that’s what we are talking about, internal reform agenda. If there are rules that determine the process and then govern everything that are not perfect, definitely to the tally it will affect your business, it will affect the way you run your affairs, and that is why the challenge I look at it is always “we,” those on the ground, those of us who are at the receiving end of it. We need to look at this critically in order to see if we can improve them. Definitely rules that are not proper will not necessarily help you in what you are doing. You need to identify them and you need to change them continuously, and it’s something that is continuous as you move forward. When we had the chance in Nigeria in the last two, three years, we are almost changing more than 50 percent of our rules already on tax, on the civil and criminal procedural laws, on literally everything, custom rules and so on. And they are necessary as part of addressing the issue of reforms and changes in the society. It’s absolutely advantageous for you to continue to change, continue to move, continue to improve. Whatever that is not working, address it as part of the process. Thank you. MR. OLOJEDE: One of the questions raised by Frannie is how do you bring new leaders into this process how adhere to some of these values or help strengthen the fight against corruption and not simply follow a fairly-well-entrenched and corrupt system, John, what’s your experience in trying to reform the government bureaucracy in Kenya, and while doing this, did you have a lot of allies? How did you bring new ones in? MR. GITHONGO: My own experience is that even in a situation where corruption is systemic, may appear to be entrenched, the entire bureaucracy looks to the top for direction, and even when I think this is an experience in other countries, even in trying to reform institutions that are systemically corrupt. One has to accept that the very individuals and parties that you are relying on to implement these reforms are themselves sometimes often people who have a tainted past but who follow the new direction. So I have great faith in the capacity of human beings to change for the positive when that leadership is provided, and I think that it’s something that is actually developing in Africa. We’re seeing more of it. I’m seeing now on the continent more executive accountability than we’ve ever had before, partially as a result of the democratic process. We have a lot more processes of transitional justice where former leaders are being subjected to questioning regarding past economic crimes and human rights abuses, which then raises the bar for those who follow. That is a slow process, and we have some spots, we have in countries city officials being charged with corruption offenses for the first time. It’s not an easy process, but it’s one that’s ongoing in a gentle, slow, sometimes in a bloody way. It has its casualties here and there, but that’s I think an essential part of the process, but I think that’s the direction. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you, John. We’re not going to go through all the other questions because I think we’d like to hear from some of you. It’s a subject that people have a certain passion for. SPEAKER: I think all these questions in part revolve around whether you have some criteria for making a judgment, and that required a lot of thought. Take this confiscatory taxation. I’m not sure that’s a great corruption problem. When people are evading, you may not want to lend to that country because it’s such a stupid policy that it’s counterproductive in development. But take the Bangladesh question: You may not want to lend to the government, but if it peculiarly has this wonderful micro-finance program which is private run and somewhat insulate from the corruption, it’s a waste of money to lend to the government, but it may not be a waste of money to lend--and I think you can make some broad criteria of that sort. It’s not going to be perfect, but you have to have some sense of what you’re doing. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you. Please identify yourself. The gentleman in the middle there. QUESTION: Just as a preliminary comment, I noticed that we have this wonderful group from Africa, from U.S. and Canada, but not a single Asian panelist. SPEAKER: I speak for you. QUESTION: Oh, you represent us. QUESTION: So I thought that maybe there is no successful model among Asian countries. But anyway, I’d like to share these thoughts with you. In the Philippines, and you probably know, is also prevalent and deep-seated, and the battle against corruption has been a losing battle for many of us who are sincerely fighting it. Now, we are grateful that many of the development institutions are helping civil societies, helping business, etcetera, to network and coordinate. That’s fine. But in a country where income inequality is so deep and wide and where people believe that it’s the elite that causes much of this bribery and corruption and graft, sometimes one wonders whether one should fund the wolf to protect the chickens. Number two, I think there is some sense in approaching corruption on a targeted basis. I mean, we do it sectorally. We attack public procurement, which we did already in the Philippines and I sponsored it in the senate. We must attack the issues of corruption surrounding land, its titling, transfer and administration, because that is what hits the poor people in the countryside, and thirdly, and I am president of a political party, we must attack corruption initiated by political parties and political leaders. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you very much. Please keep your questions or comments very short. There is beauty in economics. Thank you. QUESTION: I am from Nigeria. I have the observation that while the momentum for the fights against corruption is on the upbeat, there is also a growing cynicism about the fight itself, and so in my own country, I know that there is the perceptional crisis regarding the fight against corruption, and one of the reasons for that looks to me like we have a situation in which the people who fight corruption create a situation in which they are both the student and the examiner of what they are doing. I wonder how the international support can be sustained for the fights against corruption locally if it is limited to financing and if evaluation from outside bodies is excluded. Thank you. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you very much. Just to keep things moving quickly along, I would ask that you refer to the statement made by Mr. Wolfowitz earlier that sometimes the fight against corruption gets worse before it gets better. I think a lot of these countries that are doing bad now are going through that phase where there is a bit of cynicism because they are not used to people doing the right thing. Over time, I think that will get better, but one aspect of your question that I think bears answering in addition to what I just said, and I’ll ask Huguette to address that, is whether collaboration from outside should go beyond finance and technical support to also deal with evaluation because of your work there. MS. LABELLE: I think it depends on the situation, and what I find very often is that organizations within countries around the world like to have added to their own evaluation some peers from outside, and they feel that this adds some legitimacy to the process and sometimes de-politicizes it, depending on how it’s done. So I think it varies with each situation, but it can be helpful if this is something that the organizations feel would add to the legitimacy and the objectivity. QUESTION: This is a question for John. I was recently in Kenya, and everyone was lamenting your departure, and I was wondering if you could weave into anything that you respond to, what you were trying to do and what are the minimum conditions somebody who was trying to do what you were trying to do needs to have to be successful in terms of a watchdog role? Thank you. MR. GITHONGO: I think the absolute minimum that one requires to be able to tackle corruption in a serious way when graft has been systemic in a society, when you’re coming out of a major transition, whether it is a transition caused by some form of political trauma, civil strife or whatever, or a democratic election, is leadership. It’s political will. It’s backing to take serious anti-corruption actions, particularly in the first 18 to 24 months of an administration. That is absolutely key, because the institutional changes required in governance institutions do take time, and if that support is not there, then the most critical minimum condition is lost. It’s not something which initially can be done, you know, there are no technical solutions initially to dealing with systemic corruption. There are initial high-level executive actions that must be done steadfastly and held to. If that doesn’t happen, then the battle is interrupted in a serious way. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you, John. The gentleman over there. QUESTION: Thank you very much. I have one quick question and one very quick remark. The question really has already been posed. We’re in the middle of an area where corruption is alive and kicking. If I’m not very mistaken, the Suhartos and the Marcos' of the world have stolen the most, so if any of you would like to quickly address corruption in the neighborhood, regardless of your final destination when you go away? QUESTION: The quick remark is really pleading the Swiss case. Perhaps me, Mr. Ribadu, if I’m not very mistaken, the Swiss government is the one government who has given back the most to the Nigerian government? I stand to be corrected, but the billion dollars that was paid back from the Swiss government to the Nigerian government is the single biggest ever sum given back, and if you’ll allow me one more phrase, this is sometimes quite a problem. You have identified the money, due process of law has gone through, the money is ready to give back, and then it’s very important that the two governments, the government of the country that gives it back and the government that receives work together very constructively to make sure the money is not going wrong twice. Thank you. MR. RIBADU: Well, thank you very much. You are right. I think we have got the biggest figure from Switzerland. Possibly, it’s also because Switzerland has more than any country. MR. RIBADU: And we are grateful for that. And this is one of the things why we are desperate for understanding of governance. We paid dearly to even get that money. We had to hire the best lawyers, we had to go through accountants, we went through the justice process itself. At the end of the day, we paid a lot to get that money. Other countries like the UK got out some money without paying anything. It may not be as big as the one that came from Switzerland, it also came without conditions. When Switzerland answered that we should put our house in order for us to take the money, some of us, I am not included, felt bad about it, because we feel that for a government in Nigeria that is going through this process of reforms and so on, for you to ask we must satisfy some conditions, we feel it was not really – it didn’t come very well. But we took it and we satisfied most of the conditions. The World Bank, and I think, also came in before we got the money. But if there is a homegrown program ongoing, it needs to be supported, and we initiated the whole process of getting the money. If not, because of what we did, chances are we would have never gone through anything, and Nigeria played a big role in the changes in the finance sector in Switzerland. It’s as a result of a bunch of maybe you have new laws for the first time opening your own banking sector, which is also I think something positive coming from Nigeria, but in any case we are very grateful and we are making good use of it. The money that came went straight into the federation account, and it is being used very, very well. We need a lot of support like this. The moment you say you are not going to take money from somebody who stole money from a poor country, you are more than half addressing the issue of corruption in Africa. MR. RIBADU: It’s the worst thing that is going on. It is blood money. It is the money that we’ve used to allow our health sector to be improved. It is money that ought to have gone for education. It is money that is supposed to go for our own development. It’s small money, insignificant compared to what you have, but there are finance institutions in the world that are trading with this money. There are finance sectors in the world that are refusing to understand the need for them to open up. Hopefully if we continue to have people like Mr. Wolfowitz as the President of the World Bank, we may one day those who are stealing money in Africa will be treated like the Osama Bin Ladens of the world. Maybe, maybe then we can stop it. Thank you. MR. OLOJEDE: Huguette, If you have a comment quickly. MS. LABELLE: Just to say that this really points to the importance that so-called “developed countries” cannot have a double standard and that if they do, there should be major pressure on them to first of all not create these havens or do the prevention, because it doesn’t have to be only in fiscal havens. Make sure that those fiscal havens that have legislation that prohibits their banks from opening up when there is a case as was mentioned that basically this legislation is struck down and that there is legislation to facilitate the capacity to ensure that money is followed and that there is a prevention. So I think the other part of the double standard sometimes is that some developed countries and developed country leaders might be teaching big lessons to the rest of the world while simultaneously putting pressure to have their companies in a bidding process be the winners. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you, Huguette. We have time for one last question. Pardon me if I am unable to get to you, but I thought perhaps we should ask the lady there. My apologies, but we have to wrap up after this. QUESTION: It’s good to see two honest Nigerians up there. They say in Nigeria, the fear of ESCC is the beginning of wisdom. That’s a great step forward. But the accusation of selectivity, this is the question that I want to put to Mr. Ribadu. You have a very important test case on your hand right now. You know the one I’m talking about. And you really need to assure Nigerians that it’s truly based on the rule of evidence rather than some other political agendas, and the last question is without the FOI bill in Nigeria, which is the Freedom of Information Act, it’s really difficult for Nigerians to come up with information to assist your work. Civil society supports you 110 percent. Please be clear on that. But a lot of people are afraid to die. I mean, they want to get to heaven, but, you know, they don’t want to die to get there. So can you tell us ways and mechanisms that we can get information to you and maybe ways where some safety and guarantees are there for those who are able to give you information? Thank you very much. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you. Before I ask Nuhu to respond to this, just a quick comment, because this is a subject that people have raised with me and also personally many times, and my stock response always is instead of arguing about whether this anti-corruption fight is selective, we should ask ourselves whether it’s better to catch five armed robbers or none at all. I think it’s probably a self-defeating argument to say that unless we are able to catch all the armed robbers, we shouldn’t go after any for fear of being accused of selectivity. Nevertheless, it’s a genuine problem, and I think you probably need to address it. MR. RIBADU: Well, maybe I will answer you, Madame, by telling you that this is probably the most difficult job that you can ever do. It’s extremely, extremely difficult, difficult in the sense that you are going after people, destroying lives, taking purses from them. And the other is just to fold hands and keep quiet, don’t fight back. Some of us lose everything including our lives in the process. It’s a war that they are desperate to stop. The war hitherto in Nigeria, you would not have had it happening, because simply law enforcement argues the judiciary will just take money and keep quiet and nothing will ever happen. For the first time in the history of our country, there is a group of people who are saying that they are not going to take money, and they will do this work. What we discovered was we are going after 419 people. You know what 419 means. Nobody accused us of any selectivity or selection. When we were going after those who took money from the banks, when we recovered well over $200 billion from the banks and send most of them to prison, nobody talked about selectivity. When we were going after pipeline vandalization groups, those who were stealing the crude oil, no one talked. Now, because we are going after the politicians, the biggest of all the groups, the loudest among them, suddenly, the whole thing is selective. Selective for what? Why are we doing it? To help who? It is just because people who believe they are untouchable--that nothing can ever happen to them, that they are above the law--for the first time are being brought to justice, and we are not used to it. The only thing is for them to blackmail, to seek the possibility of reducing our capacity to go after them--give the dog a bad name for you to hang it. What are you going to achieve out of it? How can we be accused of selectivity, when possibly today--here, I am talking about the case of the Vice President; this is somebody from my own village, from my own town. I am selecting him, to benefit who? But they do not have any other thing apart from this cheap blackmail, thinking that it will work. We are not going to buy into that. We will continue with the work. We are not looking for popularity, for any election. We don't want their money, but we want justice for our country, for our people. We want to work for our future, and we are going to continue to. Thank you very much. MR. OLOJEDE: Thank you, thank you, thank you, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you very much. I think we have heard today new and novel ways of defining the problem of corruption. In other words, corruption has very serious consequences, especially so for those who are least able to afford it. So we have heard that corruption kills, that corruption is the number one factory, as John Githongo said, for manufacturing poverty. Corruption creates disease. If we are really looking at consequences, I think it allows us to better understand the magnitude of the challenge that we face in fighting corruption.
So there is no question, I think, from what we have heard from our panel that collaboration is essential to fighting corruption. We need the World Bank to help us fight corruption. We need the international financial institutions, the international organizations. We need Transparency International. We need the Nuhu Ribadus and John Githongos, and we need businesspeople who say no. We need men of wisdom like Paul Volcker who have seen it all, who bring a certain credibility and perception to the process, as is evidenced by his work with the United Nations. Finally, we should recognize that in societies where the bureaucracy is vast, the press is weak, the private sector operations under the yoke of government, these are the clearest indications of corrupt societies, and you cannot begin to fight corruption if you have an all powerful government in any society. It makes the work far more difficult to pursue. So I would like to thank our panelists--John Githongo, Mo Ibrahim, Huguette Labelle, Nuhu Ribadu and Paul Volcker--for spending this afternoon with us and to the World Bank for making it possible. Thank you very much.
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