1. The World Bank has proposed a detailed methodology for a procurement country system piloting program in 8 - 10 countries.  What remaining questions need to be addressed or clarified about this program?

q1:The most exigent “remaining question” is in the view of EIC how the Bank can preserve under the new system the central elements of the existing international procurement standard as enshrined in the Bank’s Standard Bidding Documents and in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement, which the Bank uses for training purposes. Both documents represent a very high procurement standard – even though improvements could be made with regard to some details – and they provide presently confidence for all bidders, regardless of nationality, that they can rely on fair rules and practices when participating in Bank-financed projects. Under Country Procurement Systems, this security will be at risk. Obviously, foreign bidders, and in particular small and medium-sized companies (SMEs), do not have the capacity to familiarise themselves with a multitude of different national procurement systems. As a consequence, they might withdraw from World Bank tenders and their know-how and technology would not be available for projects in developing countries, even if they were able to offer attractive solutions. Since the Bank itself, in accordance with §1.2 of its Procurement Guidelines, has the task to give all eligible bidders from developed and developing countries the same information and equal opportunity to compete in providing goods and works financed by the Bank, it must ensure, in order to maintain a truly international competition, that foreign bidders can rely on the well-established corpus of international procurement best practice also under Country Procurement Systems.

Looking in detail at the methodology prepared under the auspices of the World Bank and the OECD’s Development Assessment Committee, Hauptverband observes that, besides the vagueness of the 54 sub-indicators (see below), it completely lacks any form of minimum requirements that any given Country Procurement System would have to meet in order to provide a justification for the Bank, or other international donor agencies, to give it its blessings. The initial “equivalence assessment” as well as the subsequent “donor validation process”, which are both the cornerstones for the transfer of procurement authority from the World Bank to a national government, seem to be in the hands of only a few persons which are not identifiable for the private sector. For the sake of transparency and confidence-building, the Bank should provide further details regarding the equivalence assessment and the validation processes and it must set up explicit guidance for both stages so that the entire process does not allow for any kind of discretion or even arbitrariness.

In addition, the Methodology does not give an answer to the problem that a country which has been declared eligible for using Country Procurement Systems introduces compliant rules and regulations “on the book” but does not follow suit in the practical implementation of these rules and regulations. Therefore, it should be enhanced with certain sanctions and penalties in case of non-performance over time.

Since the application of Country Procurement Systems means in practice a unilateral mark of confidence from the part of the international donor community, those countries benefiting from such policy shift should have clearly demonstrated beforehand not only that they have equivalent Country Procurement Systems in place, but also that they are appreciating also other important international conventions which have immediate relevance for procurement in the international framework. Before being granted national procurement authority, they should thus give a binding commitment that the country will, if it has not already done so, ratify in a foreseeable period of time the World Bank’s ICSID Convention and the “New York” Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards as well as the United Nation Anti-Corruption Convention (see below). name: Frank Kehlenbach organization: German Construction Industry Federation (Hauptverband)

q1:The general sequence of the methodology is sound; more detailed guidance will be needed for the procurement specialists who will make the judgments about acceptability of specific situations; e.g. can the equivalence test be satisfied about equal opportunity if a country has a bidder registration system, etc. There should also be guidance about the number of sectors or projects in a selected country that would constitute a meaningful "pilot" without becoming an excessive burden for monitoring and supervision. Where is the Bank going to find the procurement specialist resources to make the assessments and supervise the pilot project? This will be very labor intensive and my impression is that in-house procurement expertise is stretched very thin already. Have any standards been suggested about what would be considered "unsuccessful" and "successful" pilots in terms of potential programmatic extension of the approach? name: Donald Strombom organization: International Development Business Consultants (IDBC)

q1:As the Volcker report illustrates the corruption risk in developing countries, the first question which arises is how the World Bank will deal with the risk of irregularities and corruption? The introduction of country systems would increase the risk of both corruption and irregularities and additionally, the supervision by the World Bank would become more difficult. But the World Bank needs to strengthen its supervision instead of reducing it.

Secondly, how does the World Bank intend to comply with paragraph IV.5 of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (“Where corruption exists, it inhibits donors from relying on partner country systems.”)? Compliance with the paragraph 141 of the Volcker report (“corruption is pervasive, certainly in areas where the Bank operates”) would require abstaining from the introduction of country systems.

Thirdly, have the World Bank anti-corruption specialists, in particular the Department of Institutional Integrity, been involved in the design of the proposed system? If not, it should urgently be done since the Volcker report states that the Department of Institutional Integrity “must play a central part in that effort” and demands for “a fully coordinated approach [against corruption] across the entire World Bank Group”.

Fourthly, how will the World Bank deal with SMEs e.g. from industrialized countries especially Germany? Because of the increasing complexity of the procurement progress, SMEs maybe loose interest in World Bank tenders since they have no capacity to become familiar with various different national procurement systems. Moreover, transparency in procurement procedures is considered by many SMEs as vital and a lack of transparency would therefore deter them from further bidding. Hence, their innovative spirit, know-how and technology will not be available in projects anymore.

Additionally, this also affects many other consulting firms and especially newcomers. With the introduction of country procurement systems, the World Bank would certainly not encourage newcomers to compete, although they are desirable. This arise the question, if the World Bank will support newcomers and how?

Fifthly, how will the World Bank ensure transparency? Since the Paris Declaration calls for an enhanced accountability of donors towards their citizens for an efficient use of their funds, the efficient use of funds should not be jeopardized by the application of intransparent country systems for procurement. A harmonisation of the donor procurement systems would be more useful because developing countries and potential bidders would deal with just one donor system. Moreover, it would help to ensure non-discriminatory and transparent international competition as well as effective control of application of funds.

The “equivalence assessment” which will be a crucial element of the assessment, seems to be in the hand of only a few persons. Sixthly, who takes the final decision on equivalence with the World Banks policy?

Finally, how does the Bank intend to involve the private sector in the implementation process of country systems? In our opinion, it is necessary to involve representative international business associations such as FIDIC, BIAC or CICA in particular in monitoring the process. name: Dieter Ernst, organization: Berlinwasser International AG

q1:Our company is a medium sized Danish civil enginering contractor (annual turnover approx. 1 billion USD plus) - of which half is from contracts outside our own country, incl. developing countries in Africa, Asia, Caribbean and LA. We have during the last 3 decades actively participated in bid submissions and contract implementation for numerous projects financed also by multilatral banks like WB. And a major incentive for participating in the competition has been the transparent and fair procurement guidelines "guaranteed" by the WB.

How will the Bank ensure that key issues from these guidelines are maintained with country procurement ? And how are small and medium sized  companies supposed to be able to ensure that various country procurement systems will give us same protection against unfair treatment ? How can we be sure that though a country might have "passed" the test for being allowed to use country procurement will in fact use same fair and transparent procedures as we know from the WB ? name: Flemming Baekkeskov, organization: E. PIHL & Son A.S.

q1:We find the security of a well functioning procurement standard is at risk if no international regocnised procurement standard is enforced i.e. the Bank's Standard Bidding Documents and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement.

The sub-indicators are vague and doesn't live up to equivalance assesment. As an example let me mention sub-indicatorr 1(c)"publication of tneders is mandated in at least a newspaper of wide national circulation..." All open tenders (funded by WB means)ought to be published on the WB web-site. name: Ms. Henriette Thuen, organization: The Danish Construction Association

q1:EIC fully supports the Bank with all realistic initiatives that are apt to improve the efficiency of the capacity of developing countries in scaling up procurement skills. EIC is concerned, however, that the use of Country Systems in Procurement (CPS) might lead to a watering down of the relevant international procurement standards safeguarded presently by the World Bank’s Procurement Guidelines and Standard Bidding Documents for the Procurement of Works (SBDW), including e.g. the mandatory use of the FIDIC standard contract forms, as well as the Bank’s internal provisions governing International Competitive Bidding (ICB).

We would also like to underline that the proposal for progressively increasing the use of Country Systems in Procurement carries a number of inconsistencies:

1. Over time, the "Country Procurement Systems" policy may lead to diverging procurement systems in more than 100 borrowing countries and thus runs contrary to the objectives of enhancing harmonisation of donor practice and aid effectiveness, as stated in the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness”;

2. The Bank's proposal is incongruent with the high aspirations of other institutions of the World Bank Group, namely the IFC and MIGA, which are promoting on their part the highest international standards in the field of environmental, social and ethical standards, whereas the World Bank in the area of procurement seems to be satisfied with "good procurement practices";

3. The Methodology in its current draft version pretends to be a benchmark for good international procurement practice whilst it iomits to make due reference to other well-established international benchmarks for procurement, such as the Bank's Procurement Guidelines and Standard Bidding Documents, i.e. the WTO’s Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) and the UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services. name: Gian Alfonso Borromeo, organization: European International Contractors

q1: a) The risk of irregularities and corruption: The Volcker report already illustrates the corruption risk in developing countries. Introducing country systems would increase this risk, since supervision by World Bank would become even more difficult. World Bank needs to strengthen its supervision rather than reducing it.

b)       How does the Bank intend to comply with paragraph IV.5 of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (“Where corruption exists, it inhibits donors from relying on partner country systems.”)? Given the Volcker report stating in its paragraph 141 that “corruption is pervasive, certainly in areas where the Bank operates”, compliance with the above paragraph of the Paris Declaration would require to abstain from the application of country systems.

c)       The objective must not be “to facilitate bidding for a few international bidders.” (see last slide of the presentation). The objective must be to ensure fair and non-discriminatory competition between national and international bidders.

d)       German SMEs (and SMEs from other industrialized countries) are likely to loose interest in World Bank tenders because of the complexity of the system: no capacity for being familiar with various different national procurement systems. As a consequence, their know-how/their technology will not be available in the projects.

e)       The “equivalence assessment” which would be a crucial element of the assessment, seems to be in the hands of only a few persons. Who takes the final decision on equivalence with Bank policy?

f)       How does the Bank intend to involve the private sector in the implementation process of country systems? Representative international business associations such as FIDIC, BIAC or CICA must be involved in particular in monitoring the process. name: Achim Johannsen, organization: Federation of German Industries

q1:NONE name:FRANCESCO GERBINO, organization:SOGEI S.P.A.

q1: None at this time. Stephanie Taylor, ITT Corporation

q1: Addressing sufficient borrower institutional capacity for handling procurements. name: Yuval Cohen, PhD, organization: PB

q1: Rwanda has no comments name: Ignace Beraho, organization: Rwanda Ministry of Finances Procurement Reform Task Force.

q1: A) In evaluating the success of a pilot, care should be taken to consider not only whether the pilot was successful in its own applications, but also whether the factors that led to success are likely to be repeatable on a larger scale.  The Bank should be prepared to move forward with full-scale implementation of a Country Systems program only if both conditions are met.

B) None of the 52 sub-indicators seems to address the topic of technical specifications, which if not managed closely, can provide a tempting route for illicit and inefficient bidding and evaluation practices.  The Bank should include in its evaluation measures an indicator that addresses the country’s performance in setting transparent, sufficiently objective, performance-based technical specifications. name: Mary Ann Ring, Sandy Merber, organization: General Electric

2. The OECD/DAC benchmarking index provides for scoring of 54 sub-indicators on a 0-3 scale with a score of 3 representing best practice.  30 of 54 sub-indicators in the OECD/DAC tool have been identified as critical and require achieving the highest score of 3 for 22 of the sub-indicators or a score of 2 with an agreed action plan for 8 of the sub-indicators.  Is this achievement level appropriate and if not, why?

q2:Firstly, the sub-indicators are not sufficiently precise as a basis for assessing whether a given countries’ national procurement system is equivalent to international procurement standards. They require certain formalities, but often remain silent on the substance or the details. For instance, the Sub-indicator 1(g) [Submission, receipt and opening of tenders] merely requires the “public opening of tenders (to take place) in a defined and regulated proceeding immediately following the closing date for bid submission…[and] The modality of submitting tenders and receipt by the government (must be) well defined to avoid unnecessary rejection of tenders”. This kind of vague and non-committal wording is open to all kinds of interpretation and assessments. In contrast, § 25 of the World Bank Standard Bidding Document for Major Works/Instructions to Bidders is much more elaborate about the details of the process. And the UNCITRAL Rules state in Article 33 paragraph 3 that “The name and address of each supplier or contractor whose tender is opened and the tender price shall be announced to those persons present at the opening of tenders, … and recorded immediately in the record of the tendering proceedings required”. Another important example for the current deficiency of the methodology can be found under Sub-indicator 2(f) [General Conditions of Contract]: Whereas the World Bank applies internationally recognised standard forms of contract as General Contract Conditions for certain types of works, services or supplies, the respective criterion of the methodology is again open for abuse. Therefore, these well-established standard forms which constitute at present the Bank’s General Contract Conditions should be made mandatory also under Country Procurement Systems.

Secondly, various sub-indicators in the latest version of the methodology have been watered down compared to the previous version. For example, the following important elements of international best practice are assigned lesser importance than in previous versions or have been eliminated entirely, making it permissible not to require:

-        Advertising competitive bids in a free and easily accessible site;

-        Prompt final payment in accordance with the contract;

-        Clear rules for determining whether to engage national or international procurement markets for the required purchases;

-        Requirement for hiring procurement staff through competition based on qualifications;

-        The existence of a meaningful system to capture and retain procurement data;

-        A system for collecting and disseminating procurement information to the public at little or no cost, including tender announcements, requests for proposals, and contract awards;

-        Standard bidding documents based upon international best practices.

These changes need to be revoked.

Thirdly, as regards the categorisation of the sub-indicators, it is not evident why the World Bank has distinguished between “critical and non-critical sub-indicators”. To put it simply: How can any of the sub-indicators be “non-critical”? Why would they be found in the methodology if they were not “critical”?

Finally, we would underline once again that it remains unclear who is authorised to decide on the scores. The World Bank should be more transparent about the equivalence assessment and the validation process and, in any case, should allow the private sector, e.g. through its international associations (such as BIAC, CICA, FIDIC, etc.), to have a word in all phases of the process, as it is the private companies which shall have the practical experience with procurement procedures in developing countries. name: Frank Kehlenbach organization: German Construction Industry Federation (Hauptverband)

q2:In most if not all cases, the indicator scoring is likely to be based on legal provisions, documents and prescribed policies/procedures as distinct from records/databases etc. of actual measured performance. Even so, it may be difficult to meet the scoring criteria for critical and #2 sub-critical items without resorting to "grade creep". What happens in the unstated cases: a single score of 1 or 2 in a critical item, or ten scores of 1 in non-critical items? Rather than having evaluators fudging scores to accept an apparently desirable pilot case, it would be preferable to have an in-house review committee empowered to decide when a departure from the standard is an acceptable risk. name:Donald Strombom, organization:International Development Business Consultants (IDBC)

q2:Firstly, the sub-indicators are not sufficiently precise because they require certain formalities but often remain silent on substance (of laws, regulations etc.). In contrast, the World Banks’ procurement rules provide the necessary substance.

Secondly, the categorization of the sub-indicators by the World Bank seems to be discretionary since very important sub-indicators have not been considered as essential like “2(c) Procedures for Prequalification”. In addition, we do not understand how any of the sub-indicators can be “non-critical” and why they would be listed by the DAC if they are unimportant?

Finally, it remains unclear who is supposed to decide about the scores. We think that the private sector e.g. through its international association, should have an opportunity to express their evaluation and opinion about the scoring because they avail of practical experience with procurement procedures in developing countries. name:Dieter Ernst, organization:Berlinwasser International AG

q2:Its important to maintain requirements for international advertising of invitation to submit bids (and for prequalification applications), and for some kind of internationally accepted standard bidding conditions. name: Flemming Baekkeskov, organization: E. PIHL & Son A.S.

q2:The sub-indicators are not explicit and precise. It's unclear who is authorised to decide on the scores. The sub-indicators have been watered down in the latest version compared to the previous version.

How can the WB not consider the sub-indicators under Indicator 3 as critical? We find 3(d) "systematic completion reports are prepared for certification of budget execution and for reconciliation of delivery with budget programming" very relevant and highly important just to mention one of the non-critical sub-indicators. name:Ms. Henriette Thuen, organization: The Danish Construction Association

q2:The yardstick for compliance proposed by the Bank is not appropiate, since the Methodology builds on a vague and subjective assessment methodology which shall be put into practice through completely intransparent self-review and validation mechanisms – a process which hardly lends credibility to the rating system as a whole.

Furthermore, as it stands, the Methodology does not (yet) give an answer to cases of opportunistic behaviour of Borrowers that for the sake of Bank approval draft adequate systems on the book at the time of review which are subsequently not administrated in a proper way or revised to the worse. name: Gian Alfonso Borromeo, organization: European International Contractors

q2:a)  The sub-indicators are not sufficiently precise: They require certain formalities, but often remain silent on substance (of laws, regulations etc.). In contrast, the World Bank procurement rules provide for the necessary substance, and should not be given up.

b)       The categorization of the sub-indicators undertaken by WB seems to be discretionary: How can any of the sub-indicators be “non-critical”? Why would they be on the DAC list, if they were unimportant? In any case, very important sub-indicators have not been considered as essential, e.g. “2 (c) Procedures for prequalification” which is crucial.

c)         It remains unclear who is supposed to decide on the scores. The private sector, e.g. through its international associations, has to have a word, because private companies avail of practical experience with procurement procedures in developing countries.

d)       Numerous (sub)indicators lack important provisions. In their absence, complementary criteria need to be applied: This relates inter alia to:

-        subindicator 1 (c ) that lacks a requirement to use English language and a compulsory internet publication;

-        subindicator 1 (d) that does not sufficiently guarantee that the principle of non-discrimination of international bidders is respected;

-        subindicator 1 (f): The decisions should not be based on the lowest price, but on the economously most advantageous tender;

-        subindicator 1 (h) and indicator 12: It is essential that the complaints and review procedure be effective. This requires, inter alia, stand still periods during the review procedure. name: Achim Johannsen, organization:Federation of German Industries

q2:YES name:FRANCESCO GERBINO, organization:SOGEI S.P.A.

q2: Yes, but it should be flexible. Diffrent programs/projects will have different priorities - schedule, cost, performance, etc. and the unique priorities should be given greater value based on the program/project need. Stephanie Taylor, ITT Corporation

q2: Yes. Yuval Cohen, PhD, organization: PB

q2: The OECD/DAC benchmark index is workable for Rwanda because the procurement system is being put in place and the progress is very good. The only element on which Rwanda need to focus on, is the management information system (MIS).

The Country has now started to see what can be done to get an appropriate software.

An other area under improvement is the preparation of manual which will help to meet requirement in terms of fighting corruption and fraud.  name: Ignace Beraho, organization: Rwanda Ministry of Finances Procurement Reform Task Force.

q2: In addition to comments on the indicators made by others during private sector consultation on December 10, 2007, please consider the following changes.

Sub-indicator 6.a.  The level of competence of the procurement officials is fundamental.  It should be Critical and should require a score of 3.  Currently this sub-indicator is considered Non-Critical and requires only a minimum score of 2.

Sub-indicator 12.c.  This sub-indicator should remain Critical, but require a score of 3 instead of 2.  There should already be evidence of enforcement prior to entrusting the procurement process to a Country System. name: Mary Ann Ring, Sandy Merber, organization: General Electric

3. Under this proposal, not all procurement would be included in these pilots. Should the Bank include complex, high value procurement such as those [e.g. highway construction, power generation equipment, information technology] now cleared by the Operations Procurement Review Committee (OPRC) in the use of pilot country procurement systems?

q3: Due to the importance of the subject matter, the World Bank would be well advised to field-test the application of Country Procurement Systems in the context of the so-called “National Competitive Bidding”, i.e. for projects below a certain threshold. If and when a country has proved that it is able to fairly operate its national procurement system over a period of 24 months for these types of projects, only then it should be allowed to tender bigger projects on the basis of its country system. In any case, however, infrastructure works projects with a value above 40 million US$ should be procured under the rules of International Competitive Bidding. name: Frank Kehlenbach organization: German Construction Industry Federation (Hauptverband)

q3: OPRC and its related procedures were established because it was considered that not all, or perhaps even the average, in-house qualified procurement specialists would be able to make correct and consistent decisions about complex, high value procurements without the committee's guidance. It would be stretching too far to expect that pilot country procedures would ensure adequate handling of these situations. The proposed methodology says that the Bank would exercise all sanctions in the pilots including misprocurement in cases that call for these. The complex, high value contracts are where such sanctions are more likely to be needed, and they are the most difficult situations to apply them in accordance with normal Bank standards without jeopardizing the entire pilot program. Don't add the burden of OPRC-type contracts to what is already a difficult enough program to implement. name:Donald Strombom, organization:International Development Business Consultants (IDBC)

q3:Firstly, in our opinion, pilots should definitely not apply to complex, high-level procurement.

Secondly, pilot testing should only be done for simple low-volume projects just above the threshold in order to test the country system. Basically, country systems should first be properly and successfully tested in national competitive bidding before being eventually applied to international competitive bidding. name: Dieter Ernst, organization: Berlinwasser International AG

q3:Maybe wise only to allow those countries, who have already in their national procurements demonstrated internationally accepted procurement practices, to use "country procurement" ? name: Flemming Baekkeskov, organization: E. PIHL & Son A.S.

q3:Keeping in mind the importance of the subject matter, the WB ought to test the use of CPSs in the context of the so-called "national competitive bidding" i.e. for projects below a certain threshold. name:Ms. Henriette Thuen, organization: The Danish Construction Association

q3:If and when "Country Procurement Systems" are approved for a certain Borrower, then complex projects with a countract amount of more than 30 million US$ should be excluded. Only when "Country Procurement Systems" have been successfully field-tested over a period of at least 24 months, then the Borrower should be authorised to procure high-value projects under his own national procurement system. name: Gian Alfonso Borromeo, organization: European International Contractors

q3:a)  Pilots should definitely not apply to complex, high-level procurement.

 b)      In principle, country systems should be properly and successfully tested in national competitive bidding for a number of years before being eventually applied to international competitive bidding. If at all, pilot testing must only be done for simple low-volume projects just above the threshold. name: Achim Johannsen, organization:Federation of German Industries

q3:YES name:FRANCESCO GERBINO, organization:SOGEI S.P.A.

q3: YES Stephanie Taylor, ITT Corporation

q3: No. name: Yuval Cohen, PhD, organization: PB

q3: Since documents for complex contracts (e.g highway construction, power generation equipment, information technology) are not yet available. Rwanda would suggest that National System be used for contracts up to a certain threshold. Then for complex contracts national system will be used when these specific documents will be available. By 2009 these documents may be available, up to that period, existing World Bank documents will be used. name: Ignace Beraho, organization: Rwanda Ministry of Finances Procurement Reform Task Force.

q3: Yes, serious consideration should be given to exclude large and/or complex procurements from the Country Systems pilots.  More work is needed to define complex procurements before making any judgment on the specific nature of the exclusion.  For example, in the health sector certain items, such as diagnostic imaging equipment (X-ray, MRI, CT, Ultrasound), involve a great deal of complexity especially during the process of determining clinically relevant technical specifications and their applications. name: Mary Ann Ring, Sandy Merber, organization: General Electric

4. Is the proposed handling of the Selection of Consultants in the pilots satisfactory? If not, how can this be strengthened?

q4: No Response name: Frank Kehlenbach organization: German Construction Industry Federation (Hauptverband)

q4:Consultant selection procedures are questionable already with the establishment of nationals-only thresholds, in view of the (correct) statement in the methodology that most countries don't adequately distinguish between consultant contract and other kinds. The emphasis here needs to be on clear definition of what is considered acceptable equivalence with Bank procedures and applying those decisions rigorously. name:Donald Strombom, organization:International Development Business Consultants (IDBC)

q4:Since numerous consulting firms from every country especially Germany are also interested in consulting contracts below the threshold of $100,000 to $500,000, the World Bank should not exclude them from bidding. Furthermore, these consulting firms can offer and contribute most valuable know-how. Therefore the threshold of $100,000 to $500,000 is too high.

Moreover, quality consulting services are essential for quality project implementation which implies that also for smaller projects, the World Bank should not renounce on international consulting companies’ competencies. name:Dieter Ernst, organization:Berlinwasser International AG

q4: No Response name: Flemming Baekkeskov, organization: E. PIHL & Son A.S.

q4: No Response name:Ms. Henriette Thuen, organization: The Danish Construction Association

q4: No Response name: Gian Alfonso Borromeo, organization: European International Contractors

q4:a)  The threshold of 100.000 to 500.000 $ is too high. Numerous consulting firms from Germany and other countries are interested in contracts below the threshold and offer most valuable know-how. World Bank must not exclude them from bidding.

b)       Quality consulting services are crucial for quality project implementation. This is why also for smaller projects, World Bank must not renounce on international consulting companies’ competencies. name: Achim Johannsen, organization:Federation of German Industries

q4:YES name:FRANCESCO GERBINO, organization:SOGEI S.P.A.

q4: no comment at this time Stephanie Taylor, ITT Corporation

q4: Yes - more attention on price-quality aspects. name: Yuval Cohen, PhD, organization: PB

q4: Rwanda is satisfied by the suggested way to handle selection of consultants. The request of equivalence is also accepted. name: Ignace Beraho, organization: Rwanda Ministry of Finances Procurement Reform Task Force.

q4: name: Mary Ann Ring, Sandy Merber, organization: General Electric

5. Are the proposed performance based measures sufficient to address transparency, access to information and governance and anticorruption issues (GAC) that have been raised with regard to the pilots of country systems in procurement?

q5: In this context, it is pertinent to keep in mind paragraph IV.5 of the “Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness” which stipulates that: “Where corruption exists, it inhibits donors from relying on partner country systems”! The recently released “Volcker Report” reads in paragraph 141 that “corruption is pervasive, certainly in areas where the Bank operates”. As a consequence, Country Procurement Systems should only be introduced in such countries which can demonstrate a credible and reliable track record of dedicated anti-corruption policy. In addition to the Pillar 4 of the methodology, the World Bank should make use of Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2007 (TI CPI) as a yardstick. We would suggest that eligible candidates for Country Procurement Systems must at least show a 50% achievement and should thus have 5 points or more on the TI CPI.

Despite all sorts of precaution, the introduction of Country Procurement Systems in the Bank’s client countries would increase the corruption risk, since supervision by World Bank would become even more difficult. Therefore, the World Bank needs to strengthen its supervision rather than reducing it. As an important tool, the Bank should make it mandatory to introduce “Procurement Code of Ethics” along the entire value chain, i.e. comprising the Bank itself as well as Borrowers, Contracting Authorities, Consultants. Contractors and Suppliers.

The World Bank should ensure that the Bank’s anti-corruption specialists are involved in the devolution process, in particular the Department of Institutional Integrity. Once again, the “Volcker Report” calls for “a fully coordinated approach [against corruption] across the entire World Bank Group” and further states ”that the Department of Institutional Integrity “must play a central part in that effort”, also assuming a preventive role”. name: Frank Kehlenbach organization: German Construction Industry Federation (Hauptverband)

q5:The measures adequately cover these issues but this brings us back to the question of what will sub-standard performance in applications mean with respect to the ultimate acceptance or rejection of the pilot approach. Or is there such a thing as potential non-acceptance? There should be if it turns out that the Bank's fiduciary responsibilities must be compromised in order to adopt national rules. (I personally am strongly in favor of the pilot and the whole idea of improving national systems rather than focusing only on getting acceptable results when the Bank is providing the money. I also believe, however, that the Bank's rules generally have resulted in far better treatment for suppliers/contractors than they normally get otherwise and this good performance should not be sacrificed.) name: Donald Strombom, organization: International Development Business Consultants (IDBC)

q5:For companies, it is difficult to believe that national procurement systems assure more security in anti-corruption issues than the World Bank guidelines which seem to be more reliable. We would like to refer to question number 1 since there are a lot of questions regarding transparency and corruption. name: Dieter Ernst, organization: Berlinwasser International AG

q5:Important that WB uses sufficient resources to superwise the actual "Country Procurements" when they are brought to use. Flemming Baekkeskov, organization: E. PIHL & Son A.S.

q5:Introducing CPSs in the WB's client countries would propably increase the risk of corruption, as transparency will be difficult to ensure mainly due to the fact that the client countries are low ranking on the TI corruption perception Index 2007. name:Ms. Henriette Thuen, organization: The Danish Construction Association

q5:The "Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness" adopte in March 2005 stipulates in No. 4 lit. (v) that "Where corruption exists, it inhibits donors from relying on partner country systems". The Corruption Perception Index published by "Transparency International" annualy suggests that only a handful of the Bank's Borrowers achieve more than 50% of the scoring maximum.

Against that background, there is room to believe that, as an isolated measure, compliance "on the book" with Pillar IV of the Methodology ("Integrity and Transparency") might be practically ineffective without Borrowers simultaneously demonstrating a real commitment to the fight against unethical business practices.

Such commitment could be demonstrated by the Borrower (if it has not already donce so) ratifying and implementing on the national level – without reservations – relevant conventions, such as the UN Convention Against Corruption, the UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards or the ICSID Convention. Another possibility would be to adopt a Code of Ethics for the national Contracting Authorities. name: Gian Alfonso Borromeo, organization: European International Contractors

q5:a)  No. It is difficult to believe that national procurement systems provide for more security in anti-corruption issues than World Bank guidelines. See details on Question No. 1 above.

b)       Have the World Bank anti-corruption specialists, in particular the Department of Institutional Integrity, been involved in the design of the proposed system? If not, this should urgently be done: The Volcker report calls for “a fully coordinated approach [against corruption] across the entire World Bank Group” and states that the Department of Institutional Integrity “must play a central part in that effort”, also assuming a preventive role. name: Achim Johannsen, organization:Federation of German Industries

q5:YES name:FRANCESCO GERBINO, organization:SOGEI S.P.A.

q5: YES. Stephanie Taylor, ITT Corporation

q5: I believe so. name: Yuval Cohen, PhD, organization: PB

q5: Proposed performance based measures are are necessare but not sufficient. Rwanda would suggest two more:

i/ Management of contract execution and mechanisms of control.

The idea is to measure value for money based on effective contract management.

ii/ Statute of companies to be part of required documents during evaluation process, this to avoid black listed companies who may establish new business under different identification before end of period of suspension. name: Ignace Beraho, organization: Rwanda Ministry of Finances Procurement Reform Task Force.

q5: See responses to other questions. name: Mary Ann Ring, Sandy Merber, organization: General Electric

6. Do you have other suggestions that will strengthen the World Bank Group's efforts to help countries improve their procurement systems and help us learn from these pilots?

q6: The World Bank should involve the private sector in the implementation process of country systems, particularly in the monitoring process. Since the Bank’s Procurement Guidelines under § 1.2 state the Bank’s interest in giving all eligible bidders from developed and developing countries the same information and equal opportunity to compete in providing goods and works financed by the Bank, it must communicate not only with the local business community but also with fully representative international business associations, such as BIAC, CICA, FIDIC, etc. name: Frank Kehlenbach organization: German Construction Industry Federation (Hauptverband)

q6:Selected pilot countries/implementing agencies should conduct start-up programs of 3-5 days duration, with Bank presence and participation, for all officials,managers and staff who will be responsible for carrying out the pilots. The objective will be to ensure full understanding of procedures, expectations and implications of success or failure in implementation. name:Donald Strombom, organization:International Development Business Consultants (IDBC)

q6:Referring to “Our objective is not to facilitate bidding for a few international bidders” as an objective on the last slide of the presentation on your homepage:

In our opinion, the objective must be to ensure fair and non-discriminatory competition between national and international bidders. name:Dieter Ernst, organization: Berlinwasser International AG

q6:(See 5. above.) Flemming Baekkeskov, organization: E. PIHL & Son A.S.

q6: No Response name:Ms. Henriette Thuen, organization: The Danish Construction Association

q6:The private sector, represented by the international business associations, such as BIAC, FIDIC, CICA and EIC, should be consulted by the Bank during the entire process, in particular during the monitoring phase. name: Gian Alfonso Borromeo, organization: European International Contractors

q6:It is essential to avoid conflict of interest at any level and to have procurement procedures done by well-paid specialists. name: Achim Johannsen, organization:Federation of German Industries

q6:NONE name:FRANCESCO GERBINO, organization:SOGEI S.P.A.

q6: use of general guidelines on terms and conditions, basic ordering agreements (master agreements), use of different "types" of contracts (FFP, CPFF, APFF, etc.), and use of performance statements of work, etc. Stephanie Taylor, ITT Corporation

q6: More outreach to consultant community. name: Yuval Cohen, PhD, organization: PB

q6: i/ World Bank to continue encouraging the decentralization of procurement function up to the community level. This can be done by supporting capacity building and trsnsfer of knowledge.

ii/ World Bank to support eProcurement. name: Ignace Beraho, organization: Rwanda Ministry of Finances Procurement Reform Task Force.

q6: The Bank should carefully consider how likely it is that successful pilot programs will be scalable to a general country procurement program.  Unless there is confidence that a pilot program will lead to a general program it may be a better use of the Bank’s resources at this stage to embark on a capacity building program with the objective of making broader scale improvements than a pilot program could achieve.  In developing the capacity building projects, Bank staff should consult with private sector stakeholders, e.g. bidders, who are intricately familiar with the weaknesses in current procurement practices. name: Mary Ann Ring, Sandy Merber, organization: General Electric