Selected Annotated Bibiliography on Corruption Prior to 2000

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom

Description: Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon. Developing countries and those making a transition from socialism are particularly at risk. This book suggests how high levels of corruption limit investment and growth and lead to ineffective government. Corruption creates economic inefficiencies and inequities, but reforms are possible to reduce the material benefits from payoffs. Corruption is not just an economic problem, however; it is also intertwined with politics. Reform may require changes in both constitutional structures and the underlying relationship of the market and the state. Effective reform cannot occur unless both the international community and domestic political leaders support change.

Stapenhurst, Rick and Sahr J. Kpundeh., ed. 1999. Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for Building National Integrity EDI Development. Washington DC, World Bank.

Description: This volume contains theoretical and applied studies of governance work. The book is organized in three parts. Part I presents lessons of experience, highlighting the interaction between corruption and economic performance. Examples of good practice are illustrated by the experiences of Hong Kong, Singapore and Bolivia. Part II focuses on economic and institutional approaches to anti-corruption efforts, paying particular attention to the public sector and civil society (including media). Part III presents three country case studies - Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Uganda. Surprisingly, and very unconvincing, Tanzania and Uganda are presented as success stories in curbing corruption.

Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W. 1998. The Grabbing Hand. Government Pathologies and Their Cures Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press.

Description: This collection of essays by the two economists describe many public sector interventions in economic life as predatory: heavy and arbitrary taxes retard investment, regulations enrich bureaucrats, state firms consume national wealth, and the most talented people turn to rent-seeking rather than productive activities. With some examples drawn from medieval Europe and transition economies, this contribution to economic theory has a historic and comparative approach to corruption.

Anechiarico, Frank & Jacobs, James, B. 1996. The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity. How Corruption Control Makes Government Ineffective. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Description: This is a comprehensive and controversial case study of American anti-corruption efforts. It offers a skeptical assessment of the effectiveness of these. The authors argue that the proliferating regulations and oversight mechanisms designed to prevent or root out corruption seriously undermine our ability to govern. By constraining decision-makers discretion, shaping priorities, and causing delays, corruption control - no less than corruption itself - undermines efficiency and thereby contributes to the contemporary crisis in public administration (Source: Amundsen & Fjeldstad, 2000).

Description: This book offers first-rate definitions on corruption. Authors argue that corruption is central to the "vicious circles" that sustain clientelism, electoral fraud, administrative inefficiency and criminal activities. Includes general articles like Jean Cartier-Bresson, "The Economics of Corruption" (which outlines a broad range of economic theories and shows how their precepts may enrich the study of corruption in democratic governments), a few European case studies and Jean-François Médard: "France-Africa: Within the Family" (Source: Amundsen & Fjeldstad, 2000).

Robert Klitgaard. 1988. Controlling Corruption. University of California Press.

Description: Corruption is increasingly recognized as a preeminent problem in the developing world. Bribery, extortion, fraud, kickbacks, and collusion have resulted in retarded economies, predator elites, and political instability. The book provides a framework for designing anti-corruption policies, and describes through five case studies how courageous policymakers were able to control corruption.

Selected annotated articles on corruption prior to 2000

Bardhan, Pranab. 1997. “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues.” Journal of Economic Literature 35 (Sept): 1320-1346.

Abstract: This article is a highly useful and excellent review of the literature on corruption. It divides the literature among five general issues: corruption and efficiency, corruption and growth, national differences in corruption, policy issues in reducing corruption, and incentives for reducing corruption. Task managers will find this article to be an excellent introduction into a large and highly varied literature on the subject.

Ades, Alberto and Rafael Di Tella. 1996. “Causes and Consequences of Corruption: A Review of Empirical Contributions.” IDS Bulletin: Liberalization and the New Corruption 27, 2 (April): 6-11.

Abstract: This paper reviews the empirical literature on corruption to show how new data sets are contributing to robust studies and testing of hypotheses.

Manion, Melanie. 1996. “Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing.” The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 12, 1 (April): 167-195.

Abstract: This article employs game theory to examine the payment of bribes to officials. It demonstrates how the information asymmetries lead to an official’s ability to demand payment for services that are part of their positions. The article concludes that to move away from an equilibrium in which corruption is common requires substantial institutional changes. The utility of this piece is that it provides a rigorous analysis of information availability and corruption.

Mauro, Paolo. 1995. “Corruption and Growth.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 2 (August): 681-711.

Abstract: This important article analyzes a data set, obtained from Business International, that shows that corruption, red tape, an inefficient judiciary and political instability lower investment and economic growth. It shows that a one-standard deviation improvement in bureaucratic efficiency contributed to an increase in investments. The article argues forcefully that reducing corruption and bureaucratic impediments has a direct impact on investment and economic growth.

Schleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishney. 1993. “Corruption.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 58, 3 (August): 599-617.

Abstract: The article focuses on the consequences of corruption for resource allocation. It argues that political structures and processes determine the extent of corruption in a given country. Unlike its sibling taxation, corruption is costly and therefore detrimental to a country’s economic development. The paper draws important considerations of corruption as an activity that occurs under conditions of secrecy.

Murphy, Kevin M., Andrei Schleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1993. “Why is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth.” American Economic Review 83, 2 (May): 409-414.

Abstract: This article argues that rent-seeking is harmful to growth for two reasons. First, rent-seeking tends naturally to have increasing returns. The effect is that high levels of rent-seeking are self-sustaining. Second, public rent-seeking is particularly harmful to innovation. The authors assert that innovation is a key element in economic growth and rent-seeking is therefore costly to growth.

Krueger, Anne O. 1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” The American Economic Review 64, 3 (June): 291-303.

Abstract: This seminal article introduces the concept of rents that are present in government monopolies. Competitive rent-seeking is a factor in societies where governments control sectors of the economy. The articles analyzes the opportunities created through state-owned enterprises, quantitative restrictions, and tariffs that lead to rent-seeking.