 Incentives and the Role of Institutions in the Provision of Social Safety Nets (114KB PDF). Also available in Français (127KB PDF) ◘ Русский (329KB PDF)
Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0226; Publication Date: 09/02
by Chris de Neubourg
Institutions matter in the design and implementation of social programs in general and for social safety net programs in particular. This paper argues that what matters most for the success of programs are the incentives that are provided to stakeholders and actors through institutions. The paper critically examines the effects of different incentive structures that operate between program providers and the sponsors of programs and between providers and clients, illustrated with reference to developed and developing country examples. In light of these incentive effects, the paper then examines possible strategies for safety net implementation under three distinct institutional settings, including limited institutional capacity, nascent development, and more mature environments.  Related Note (56KB PDF). Also available in Bahasa Indonesia (132KB PDF) ◘ Español (137KB PDF) ◘ Русский (168KB PDF)
A Lecture on the Political Economy of Targeted Safety Nets (706KB PDF)
Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0501; Publication Date: 01/05
by Lant Pritchett This paper is the written version of a lecture that draws principally on the author's research on safety nets and on the operational experience with the implementation of safety nets, drawing heavily on the crisis safety net programs in Indonesia from 1998 to 2000. As such it provides more views than reviews of the literature on the principal issues in the political economy of targeted safety net programs. Five major issues are reviewed: First, the implications of some simple models of electoral politics which make the budget allocated to programs endogenous to their targeting design highlight the dangers in ignoring political economy. Second, the political economy of “safety net” versus “safety rope” programs is reviewed. Third, some of the literature on the perception of fairness of the targeting criteria is reviewed. Fourth, the issue of local versus central targeting of programs is discussed. Fifth, the political economy of program implementation that considers the fit between program targeting and the organizational culture of the implementing organization is considered. Related Note (167KB PDF). Also available in Español (137KB PDF) ◘ Русский (100KB PDF)
Public Attitudes Matter: A Conceptual Frame for Accounting for Political Economy in Safety Nets and Social Assistance Policies (179KB PDF). Also available in Français (194KB PDF) ◘ Русский (542KB PDF)
Social Protection Discussion Paper No. 0233; Publication Date: 12/02
by Carol Graham Political economy influences the design, implementation, and outcome of safety net and other social insurance programs, but there is no general consensus among policymakers about how to account for political economy concerns in policy decisions. This paper tries to provide a conceptual framework for doing so, with a focus on the establishment of permanent systems of social assistance and social insurance. This framework attempts to incorporate political attitudes about redistribution and equality of opportunity versus equality of outcomes, attitudes that vary a great deal among countries and regions. This paper discusses the instruments available to policymakers for evaluating their own political contexts, as well as strategies for introducing new approaches to safety nets and social welfare policy in the face of entrenched political attitudes. Related Note (61KB PDF). Also available in Bahasa Indonesia (145KB PDF) ◘ Español (147KB PDF) ◘ Русский (102KB PDF) |
RSS