Governance, Civil Society and Participation

This paper argues that anti-corruption commissions fail to reduce public sector venality in all but a few special circumstances. It notes that those governments that have established successful anti-corruption commissions have done so in response to demands for reform from a broad base of domestic constituents. Demands for reform generally occur after a precipitating crisis has caused deep economic hardship and a national consensus exists that reforms must be implemented. Anti-corruption commissions are effective when they respond to that national consensus and a broad domestic coalition supports reform. Without the precipitating crisis, building such domestic coalitions is a challenge for even the most popular leaders. When support is more tenuous, policymakers have an incentive to weaken reforms and avoid any threat to powerful constituents who profit from official inattention to expenditures, access to governments contracts, and other manifestations of public sector inefficiency.

“Can parliaments make an effective contribution to the budget process while preserving fiscal discipline?” is one of the key questions this Paper seeks to answer. Parliaments do possess a wide range of budgetary powers, but often fail to exercise them effectively or responsibly. The paper explores the contribution of parliaments to the budget process in presidential systems of government with highly centralised budgetary systems. It offers a political economy perspective on the budget process in Latin America and reveals increased legislative budget activism since the restoration of democracy. It argues that a more purposeful contribution of parliaments to the oversight of the budget might help countries seeking greater accountability in the management of public finances. Ultimately, the governance of the budget reflects a delicate balance between executive power and legislative oversight. The key challenge of legislative budgeting in Latin American is how to retain the advantages of strong executive authority required to ensure fiscal discipline while providing the institutional checks and balances that guarantee effective accountability.

The World Bank and other donors are fully committed to modalities of development support that put countries in the driver’s seat, with the poverty reduction strategy process —prepared by national governments, on the basis of close consultation with civil society—providing the framework for that support. An effective poverty reduction strategy process and a productive partnership can be built only on a platform of strong public capacity: capacity to formulate policies; capacity to build consensus; capacity to implement reform; and capacity to monitor results, learn lessons, and adapt accordingly. Building the requisite capacities turns out to be a formidable challenge. For these reasons, enhancing the capacity of African states has risen to the top of the continent’s development agenda.
In recent years, a number of African governments have moved forward with new-style programs to build public sector capacity. Building State Capacity in Africa aims to share some of the lessons for the design and implementation of public sector capacity building that are emerging from this new generation of operational practice. It also exemplifies an increasingly collaborative way of working within the World Bank Group. This book draws on in-depth Bank research and research projects were done in collaboration with African development partners and scholars. The editors contend that this model of working together constitutes the most effective way for the World Bank Group to contribute, in its role as a knowledge Bank, to the challenge of building state capacity in Africa.

In Africa discussions have intensified recently over the role of civil society in bringing about greater government accountability to its citizens, particularly with regard to the flow of public resources. Through the lessons of civic engagement, participation, and civic ownership, citizen groups in Africa are now beginning to hold a growing number of public officials and service providers accountable for their actions and behaviours.  Such social accountability is working to bring about more efficient and equitable governance by reducing corruption and improving delivery of public services to the poor. This report synthesizes a stocktaking of civil society-initiated social accountability practices in the public budgetary process in 10 Anglophone African countries—Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

This paper points at an array of institutional leadership options available to countries at various development levels. Understanding these options and their respective strengths and weaknesses is a starting point for country leaders and other policymakers to fashion the institutional mechanisms and competencies that e-development requires. The report identifies five broad archetypes or basic institutional models and considers the experience of various countries in terms of these models. It provides a list of pros and cons of each model, based on recent country results. It also identifies the core capabilities that e-Development institutions should possess to achieve and sustain ICT-enabled economic and social transformation.  It also suggests a research agenda to further our understanding of the governance and institutional mechanisms needed to guide e-Development.

This paper examines one of the most important roles for legislatures—that of financial oversight—and considers some of the lessons emerging from a decade of legislative development and reform.

The paper by Pelizzo and Stapenhurst presents the data collected from a survey of 83 countries by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in collaboration with the World Bank Institute. The data analysis reveals that legislatures in parliamentary systems are generally better equipped to oversee government activities than are legislatures in presidential and semipresidential systems. The paper also investigates the role of legislatures in preparing and approving the budget. The analysis reveals that legislatures in presidential systems are generally the most active legislatures in the preparation of the budget, while parliaments are the most active legislatures in approving the budget.

This important new series represents a response to several independent evaluations in recent years that have argued that development practitioners and policy makers dealing with public sector reforms in developing countries and, indeed, anyone with a concern for effective public governance could benefit from a synthesis of newer perspectives on public sector reforms. This series distills current wisdom and presents tools of analysis for improving the efficiency, equity, and efficacy of the public sector. Leading public policy experts and practitioners have contributed to the series.

The objective of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework, including concrete examples, for controlling corruption at the local level. It outlines strategies to involve civil society in policymaking and monitoring, to identify reform priorities through diagnostic tools, and to develop systems and processes to improve government performance.

This paper traces the involvement of legislators in the PRS process and identifies key bottlenecks which make deeper engagement difficult.  The paper offers suggestions for strengthening parliamentary oversight and civil society’s interface with parliament on poverty reduction issues.

The Role of Parliaments in the Budget Process is a collection of several papers that were presented at the roundtable organized by the World Bank Institute and the Research Committee of legislative specialists. “The Role of Parliaments in the Budget Process” roundtable was held at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting (New Orleans, LA) in January 5-9, 2005.

The first article examines data from 43 countries to explain the different institutional arrangements to oversee the budget process. The second one analyses the bargaining process in the legislature of the Czech Republic. The next paper studies the role of the Italian parliament to observe how institutional and political conditions influence the legislative power over the budget. Finally, the fourth paper discusses the potential value of independent analytical budget units for the legislature in increasing the transparency, credibility and accountability of the budget process.

This working paper was developed as a resource for newly elected legislators. The paper outlines the core functions of legislatures, presents a model of parliamentary power that differs from the traditional model, allowing legislators to identify their type of legislature, including its strengths and weaknesses. The paper considers the factors that influence parliamentary capacity: political and electoral systems, formal parliamentary powers, political will and space, and the technical capacity of parliaments. It concludes by presenting some recent examples of parliamentary development – noting where progressive parliamentary leadership has resulted in substantial increases in parliamentary autonomy and parliamentary effectiveness.

2005. 23 pages. Stock No. 37251.  Full text PDF 132 KB

The paper by Pelizzo and Stapenhurst presents the data collected from a survey of 83 countries by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in collaboration with the World Bank Institute. The data analysis reveals that legislatures in parliamentary systems are generally better equipped to oversee govern-ment activities than legislatures in presidential and semipresidential systems. The paper also inves-tigates the role of legislatures in preparing and approving the budget. The analysis reveals that leg-islatures in presidential systems are generally the most active legislatures in the preparation of the budget, while parliaments are the most active legislatures in approving the budget.