In his new book Wars, Guns, and Votes, best-selling author Paul Collier argues that fragile states are unable to provide two vital public goods, security and accountability, due to a dire lack of leadership
The “three illicit electoral tactics,” bribing, voter intimidation, and ballot fraud are extremely effective in handicapping the democratic process and its ability to provide public goods— politicians who use these tactics hold power three times longer than those who do not
Collier calls on the international community to boost troops and aid to fragile states, especially after elections, to eject them from the cycle of insecurity
Collier, professor of economics at Oxford University, spoke March 3 at a book launch sponsored by the Bank's Operational Policy and Country Services (OPCS) and InfoShop––with his characteristic mix of disarming modesty, original maxims, and provocative proposals for fixing fragile, failing, and post-conflict states.
Security, Accountability Linked to Leadership
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In outlining his book’s central argument, he noted that many of the 58 countries that are home to one billion of the world’s poorest people––the "bottom billion"––are unable to provide their citizens with two vital public goods: security and accountability. What causes this persistent failure, which makes these states fragile, and often racked by conflict? It boils down to a lack of national leadership, he said.
Viable nation-states are led by effective national elites that produce effective leaders able to forge a sense of national identity and cohesion. Without effective national elites, however, Collier said, "Subnational factions take over." Conflict often ensues as these factions fight over control of the state, especially if control brings revenues from a vital resource such as oil.
Poverty, stagnation, small size, and the existence of resource rents thus combine to make many of these states "structurally insecure," Collier said. That insecurity prompts spiraling military spending, which, rather than leading to national unification, has the opposite effect. As a result, such states fail to deliver security to their citizens.
As for the failure of such states’ governments to be accountable, Collier traces this to a lack of alignment between the interests of elites and the larger population.
Lack of accountability matters to development, Collier insisted, because it means there are no checks and balances to inhibit corruption. With corruption unchecked, the country’s development is undermined by massive losses of potential revenue.
Why Democracy Fails
The question at the heart of Wars, Guns, and Votes is, "Why has democracy so often failed to deliver security and accountability in fragile states?"
Collier traces the answer to the grim reality that "three illicit electoral tactics"—bribing voters, intimidating voters, and outright ballot fraud—are extremely effective at keeping bad leaders in power. His data show that political leaders who use these tactics hold power three times longer than those who don’t.
Electoral contests marred by such abuses do not produce the principled leaders countries need. Collier contrasted post-independence governance in Kenya and Tanzania: while in Kenya, Daniel arap Moi’s 24-year rule was marred by corruption and electoral manipulation; and Tanzania has enjoyed a remarkably stable democracy thanks largely to the compelling leadership of Julius Nyerere, who, Collier said, "was able to build a sense of national identity in Tanzania."
Should Rich Nations Intervene?
Collier argues that, because elections actually increase the danger of renewed conflict, donors may need to boost both troops and aid after an election, to get fragile states out of the cycle of insecurity.
Such arrangements should be based on "mutual commitments, mutually reinforced," in which fragile state governments commit to observing "red lines" on military activity, economic management, and integrity in governance, while donors commit to guaranteeing security for leaders and delivering aid over the long term.
Collier finds a potential incentive for better governance in the fear of coups he observes among presidents of "bottom billion" countries.
With 357 coups recorded since 1945, he suggests "a red card/green card standard for coups. If elections are free and fair," he said, "the President gets the green standard, and the international community agrees to defend his government against a coup."
Bank Leaders Respond
Collier’s provocative arguments prompted discussantsSanjay Pradhan, vice president of the World Bank Institute, andShantayanan Devarajan, chief economist for the Africa Region, to offer proposals of their own.
Devarajan noted that an obstacle to instituting accountability in resource-rich and post-conflict developing countries lies in the fact that their revenues typically come from resource rents and foreign aid. One option to overcome this, he suggested, would be for governments to distribute the resource rents to the population and tax them back.
Pradhan, who hosted the event, underlined Collier’s emphasis on leadership, and called for initiatives to provide guidance to potential leaders in fragile and developing countries, especially those riven by ethnic divisions or warring ethnic divisions.
"It is important to work with leaders at various levels of society in fragile and post-conflict states, including youth leaders, to help build this more inclusive and cohesive leadership. This would complement any international intervention that Paul Collier advocates with domestic leadership capacity building, for more sustainable results," Pradhan said.
Contributed by Christopher Neal, senior Communications Officer for WBI
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