Globally Confronting the Challenge of Governance and Corruption

Some Lessons Learnt, Pending Challenges

Daniel Kaufmann, World Bank Institute

www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance

Background Handout for Breakfast Discussion with Staff from the US Congress, sponsored by CFR/WB’s EXT

Washington, D.C., December 2nd, 2004
Key Themes

1. Governance: Missing in the Washington Consensus
2. Governance *can* be measured, analyzed, & monitored
3. Governance Matters for Development and Security
4. Learn from Variation across countries & Institutions
5. Learning from in-depth work within a country
6. Does corruption necessarily imply illegality?
7. Some Key Findings – and Addressing Misconceptions
8. Salient Policy Implications and Challenges ahead
Evolution of Governance/A-C at the World Bank: From C ... ‘Prohibition’ era to Mainstreaming

- WDR on Institutions 1982
- TI CPI (5/95)
- JDW “Cancer of Corruption” Speech (10/96)
- State in a Changing World (97)
- Strategic Compact (97)
- Anti-corruption Strategy (97)
- Governance Pillar - CDF (98)
- Governance Diagnostics start (98)
- O.P. Mainstreaming AC in CAS (99)
- Governance Strategy (00)

The ‘Prohibition’ Era


Broadening & Mainstreaming

- Public Expenditure, Financial Mgt. & Procurement Reforms
- Diagnostic/Data/ Monitoring Tools
- Administrative & Civil Service Reform
- Civil Society Voice, Accountability, Media & Transparency Mechanisms
- State Capture/Corporate Governance
- Legal/Judicial Reform

- Internal AC unit created in WB (98)
- 1st set of firms Debarred from WB (99)
- Formalization of INT (01)
The World Bank’s Department of Institutional Integrity (INT) was created in March 2001. Its core functions are to:

- Investigate allegations of fraud and corruption in World Bank Group projects,
- Investigate allegations of misconduct by Bank staff, and
- Train and educate staff and clients in detecting and reporting fraud and corruption in World Bank Group projects.

What the World Bank’s Department of Integrity (INT) does

- Receipt of Allegation
  - Hotline, Website, etc.
- Investigate
  - Preliminary Inquiry
  - Prioritization
  - Full Investigation
- Deterrence
  - Sanctions Cttee/Debarment List
  - Misprocurement Declared
  - Internal Disciplinary Proceeding
  - Referral for Prosecution or Relevant Action
- Prevention
  - Support to Country Teams
  - Lessons Learned
  - Publicize Results
  - Capacity of Clients
Overall Approach: Good governance has many dimensions and “entry points”

Institutional Checks & Balances
- Independent, effective judiciary
- Legislative oversight
- Decentralization with accountability
- Global initiatives: OECD Convention, anti-money laundering, WCO

Political Accountability
- Political competition, credible political parties
- Transparency in party financing
- Disclosure of parliamentary votes
- Asset declaration, conflict-of-interest rules

Civil Society Voice & Participation
- Freedom of information
- Public hearings on draft laws
- Media/NGOs
- Community empowerment
- Report cards, client surveys

Competitive Private Sector
- Economic policies
- Restructuring of monopolies
- Effective, streamlined regulation
- Robust financial systems
- Corporate governance
- Collective business associations

Public Sector Management
- Meritocratic civil service with adequate pay
- Public expenditure, financial management, procurement
- Tax and customs
- Frontline service delivery (health, education, infrastructure)

GOOD GOVERNANCE
World Bank projects with Governance Components (Annual Averages)

Number of Projects

Number of IBRD/IDA Operations with Explicit Anti-Corruption Components, 1997-2003

(Source: Business Warehouse Data, 7/14/2003)
Explosion of activities: Examples of major programs launched across countries

- Latvia (anticorruption)
- Russia (customs/treasury)
- India – Andhra Pradesh (power; e-gov); Karnataka (right to info)
- Colombia (diagnostics & civil society)
- Jordan (civil society)
- Indonesia (local governance)
- Philippines (transport)
- Ukraine (tax admin)
- Korea (public admin.)
- Ghana (PE accountability)
- Gabon (water/electricity)
- Uganda (PRSC; education)
- Tanzania (PSR)
- Ethiopia (decentralization)
- Pakistan (devolution)
- Bangladesh (civil society)
- Bolivia: (public admin.)
- Guatemala (diagnostic to action program)
- Kyrgyz Republic (governance reform)
- Cambodia (PE; forestry)
- Bangladesh (civil society)
- Gabon (water/electricity)


**Challenges: WBI – Governance & Anticorruption Program**

**Lessons learned: 7 African Countries**

**Anticorruption Core Course: Integrated Participatory Strategy**

**Approach**

- Participatory process
  - Country-led
- Diagnostics, R&D, & ‘Data Power’
  - External accountability
  - Empowerment
- From individuals to *multi-stakeholder* Country Teams
- Integrating governance components
- Participatory Action applied to many programs

**1st Steps for an AC Strategy:**

- Empowerment & Coalition-Building
- Towards Priorities for Systemic Change
- Strategy Design
- Tools for Diagnosis: Data Power

**Distance Learning through VC to 7 capitals in AFR (over 6 weeks)**

**Presentation of Action Program for each country (international Anti-Corruption Conference in Durban)**

**Program Implementation – Institutional Reforms**
Challenges: WBI – Governance & Anticorruption Program (1999)

Lessons learned: 7 African Countries

- **Underestimation of politics and insufficient buy-in by top decision makers**

General: Major spillover effect from this A-C program in mainstreaming strategies involving ‘voice’/collective action; in diagnostic data approaches; in action programming; and ex-post recognition of political constraints.

- **Politics:**
  - Understanding & realism
  - State capture?
  - Drawing in the private sector

- **Integration of decision makers**

- **Better integration within the Bank**

- **Upstream focus on implementability**

Results

1. Malawi
2. Benin
3. Ethiopia
4. Kenya
5. Tanzania
6. Ghana
7. Uganda
Latvia’s Anticorruption program

Objectives
Increasing efficiency and accountability of gov’t by strengthening: 1) strategic capacity; 2) transparency; 3) incentives; 4) internal controls; 5) participation and oversight

Approach
Building capacity in gov’t – 1) to manage and coordinate reforms and 2) to provide information and opportunities to public to monitor reforms

Results
After 6 years of assistance and program implementation:
- State capture has declined and corruption is less of an obstacle to doing business
- Latvia is expected to integrate into the EU in 2004

Challenges
Implementation is uneven – across areas and over time
- Identify whether constraint is technical or political
  - If technical, provide TA (although resources are limited)
  - If political, withhold financial support (PSAL2 was delayed and then reduced by 50%)
Empirical Approach to Governance

1. ‘Macro’: Worldwide Aggregate Governance Indicators: 200 countries, 6 components, periodic.

2. ‘Mezzo’: Cross-Country Surveys of Enterprises

3. ‘Micro’: Specialized, in-depth, in-country Governance and Institutional Capacity Diagnostics: Includes surveys of: i) user of public services (citizens); ii) firms, and iii) public officials

On ‘Aggregate/Macro’ Level first...
Governance: A working definition

- *Governance is the process and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised:*
  
  (1) the process by which governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced;
  
  (2) the capacity of gov’t to manage resources and provide services efficiently, and to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations; and, 
  
  (3) the respect for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them
Operationalizing Governance: Unbundling its Definition into Components that can be measured, analyzed, and worked on

Each of the 3 main components of Governance Definition is unbundled into 2 subcomponents:

- Democratic Voice and *(External)* Accountability
- Political Instability, Violence/Crime & Terror
- Regulatory Burden
- Government Effectiveness
- Corruption
- Rule of Law

We measure these six governance components…
Sources of Governance Data

• Data on governance from 25 different sources constructed by 18 different organizations

• Data sources include cross-country surveys of firms, commercial risk-rating agencies, think-tanks, government agencies, international organizations, etc.

• Over 200 proxies for various dimensions of governance

• Organize these measures into six clusters corresponding to definition of governance, for four periods: 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002, covering up to 199 countries
Sources of Governance Data

• Cross-Country Surveys of Firms: *Global Competitiveness Survey, World Business Environment Survey, World Competitiveness Yearbook, BEEPS*

• Cross-Country Surveys of Individuals: Gallup International, Latinobarometro, Afrobarometer

• Expert Assessments from Commercial Risk Rating Agencies: DRI, PRS, EIU, World Markets Online,

• Expert Assessments from NGOs, Think Tanks: Reporters Without Borders, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Amnesty International

Building Aggregate Governance Indicators

• Use Unobserved Components Model (UCM) to construct composite governance indicators and margins of error for each country

• Estimate of governance: weighted average of observed scores for each country, re-scaled to common units

• Weights are proportional to precision of underlying data sources

• Margins of error of the aggregate indicator reflect (a) number of sources in which a country appears, and, (b) the precision of those sources
Governance can be measured – an illustration

Control of Corruption, Selected Countries (K&K, 2002)

Source for data: Kaufmann D., Kraay A., Mastruzzi M., Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002, WP #3106, August 2003. Units in vertical axis are expressed in terms of standard deviations around zero. Country estimates are subject to margins of error (illustrated by thin line atop each column), implying caution in interpretation of the estimates and that no precise country rating is warranted.
Governance World Map: Rule of Law, 2002


Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Red, 25% or less rank worse (bottom 10% in darker red); Orange, between 25% and 50%; Yellow, between 50% and 75%; Light Green between 75% and 90%; Dark Green above 90%
Governance World Map: Voice and Accountability, 2002

Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Red, 25% or less rank worse (bottom 10% in darker red); Orange, between 25% and 50%; Yellow, between 50% and 75%; Light Green between 75% and 90%; Dark Green above 90%
Measuring Governance Matters

Disentangling Causality Between Incomes & Governance

• Does Good Governance Matter in raising per capita incomes, controlling for other factors and for reverse causality – i.e. is there a large “governance dividend”?  
  – Yes, about 400% in terms of incomes per capita, and similar ‘dividend’ in terms of social development

• Conversely: To what extent do increases in income lead to improvements in governance – i.e. is there a virtuous circle?  
  – No, governance is not a ‘luxury’ which countries attain only when they become wealthier
Dividend of Good Governance

**Infant Mortality and Corruption**

- **Weak**
- **Average**
- **Good**

**Per Capita Income and Regulatory Burden**

- **Weak**
- **Average**
- **Good**

**Literacy and Rule of Law**

- **Weak**
- **Average**
- **Good**

**Per Capita Income and Voice and Accountability**

- **Weak**
- **Average**
- **Strong**

**Note:** The bars depict the simple correlation between good governance and development outcomes. The line depicts the predicted value when taking into account the causality effects (“Development Dividend”) from improved governance to better development outcomes. For data and methodological details visit [http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance](http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance).
Governance Improving Worldwide? -- *Mixed*

- On average, over the past 8 years: some progress on Voice and Democratic Accountability, but little if any on the quality of rule of law and control of corruption
- However, the variation across countries is very large: For instance, some countries in Eastern Europe have improved. In each region there is significant variation across countries. Good: Chile, Costa Rica, Botswana
- Important to ‘unbundle’ governance and corruption: *improvement in some dimensions, deterioration in others*
- Where corruption is systemic, unrealistic to expect that Bank projects/lending could be totally immune
But we are facing many challenges, as on average there is little evidence of significant improvement on control of corruption …

Source: ICRG, 1994-2002. Subject to margins of error, as it is based on only one source.
The ‘Mezzo’ Level of Governance Measurement

• Based on cross-country surveys, mainly of enterprises – such as the EOS of the WEF, BEEPS and WBES of the WB, etc.
• Thousands of firms interviewed on a range of issues; typically significant prominence on governance
• More detailed unbundling of governance and corruption phenomena than aggregate indicators
• Relatively broad country coverage, but less than aggregate governance indicators
Control of judicial bribery over time: 
EOS 1998–2004

Source: EOS 1998-2004. Question: “In your industry, how commonly firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected to getting favorable judicial decisions? common / never occur”.
Signs of progress in some countries & dimensions of governance – *but overall challenges remain*

Less Frequency of Bribes (*transition*)  
(*Selected Countries, BEEPS II*)

Country | Frequency of Administrative Corruption
---|---
Albania | Decrease in bribe frequency
Armenia | Decrease in bribe frequency
Azerbaijan | No change
Belarus | Increase in bribe frequency
BiH | Increase in bribe frequency
Bulgaria | Increase in bribe frequency
Croatia | Increase in bribe frequency
Czech Republic | Increase in bribe frequency
Estonia | Increase in bribe frequency
FYROM | Increase in bribe frequency
Georgia | Increase in bribe frequency
Hungary | Increase in bribe frequency

...but more firms engaged in State Capture  
(*by sub-region, BEEPS II*)

![Graph showing frequency of administrative corruption](image-url)
Impact on Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) Rank of Improvement in Constraint to the Firm

Source: Constraints to Business data based on EOS 2004 (Question: “From the following list, please select the five most problematic factors for doing business in your country, and rank them from 1 to 5.”); GCI based on GCR team calculations for 2004/2005 Report; GDP per capita from World Bank. Calculations based on regression estimates of the impact on the GCI of an improvement in the constraint by one standard deviation.
Unbundling Governance – some illustrations:
View of the Firm, 102 countries (EOS 2003)

Percent of firms rating constraints as dissatisfactory

- Administrative Bribery
- Bribery to Influence Laws
- Illegal Political Financing

Source: EOS 2003. Each region has the following number of countries: OECD: 23; East Asia (Developing): 6, East Asia (NIC): 4; Eastern Europe: 14; Former Soviet Union: 2 (Russia and Ukraine); South Asia: 4; Sub-Saharan Africa: 21; Middle East North Africa: 7; Latin America and Caribbean: 21.
Defining, Measuring and Analyzing Legal Corruption

- Old, traditional definition of corruption:
  ‘Abuse of public office for private gain’
- Problems – i) interpreted in terms of legality of act (illegal = corrupt; legal = non-corrupt?);
  ii) onus is on the public official (asymmetry), and,
  iii) measurement bias towards ‘petty corruption’
- Alternative: ‘Privatization of public policy’ (e.g. ‘undue influence by private interests on public policy actions’)
- This implies that some actions may be legal strictly speaking, but illegitimate, inconsistent with standards and/or corrupt
- These legal forms of corruption can be measured
Corporate and Public Sector Ethics Indices, 2004

% Firms rate satisfactory

Acronyms: CICC: Corporate Illegal Corruption Component; CLCC: Corporate Legal Corruption Component; CEI: Corporate Ethics Index (the average of both legal and illegal corporate corruption components, CEIC and CELC), ; PSEI: Public Sector Ethics Index; JLEI: Judiciary / Legal Effectiveness Index; CGI: Corporate Governance Index. Source: Author’s calculations based on EOS 2004. See Legend of Table 2 for detailed definition and inputs into each ethics index.
State Capture
Firms shape the legal, policy and regulatory environment through *illicit, non-transparent* provision of private gains to public officials

• Examples include:
  – *private purchase of legislative votes*
  – *private purchase of executive decrees*
  – *private purchase of court decisions*
  – *illicit political party financing*
Economic Cost of Capture for Growth

Based on survey of transition economies, 2000
Addressing Capture: Economic Reform, Political Competition & Voice/Civil Liberties Matter

State Capture Index

- Partial Civil Libs
- High Civil Libs
- Advanced
- Partial
- Slow

Pace of Econ Reform

Political/ Civil Liberties Reforms
Frequency of bribery at home and abroad, EOS 2004

Source: EOS 2004. The percentage of firms that report bribery takes place within its group in the country is depicted in each case. EOS Question on which these calculations are based: “In your industry, how commonly would you estimate that firms make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with the following: public utilities, tax payments, awarding of public contracts? very common (1) / never occur (7)”. Any firms reporting answers 1 through 5 were considered to be reporting at least some frequency of bribery, while answers of 6 and 7 were not.
Global vs Domestic Governance Challenges: % Firms Report High Cost of Terrorism and Crime, EOS 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Cost of Terrorism</th>
<th>Organized Crime</th>
<th>Common Crime</th>
<th>State Capture Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia NICs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia Developing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EOS 2004. A firm is considered as reporting high cost when rated the question as unsatisfactory (1, 2, or 3) in the scale of 1 to 7. Questions were, respectively: “The threat of terrorism in your country, incidence of common crime and violence (e.g. street muggings, firms being looted), organized crime (mafia-oriented racketeering, extortion) in your country impose / does not impose significant costs on business?”; “In your country the diversion of public funds to companies, individuals or groups due to corruption is common / never occurs”.

In the chart, the x-axis represents different regions, and the y-axis represents the percentage of firms reporting high cost. The bars indicate the cost for terrorism, organized crime, common crime, and state capture cost.
Firm’s Cost of Terrorism threat and Organized Crime (% Firms Report High Cost, selected countries)

Source: EOS 2002/03. Question: The threat of terrorism in your country imposes significant cost on business
Money Laundering through Banks and Diversion of Public Funds

$r = 0.85$
Key Features of in-depth Country Governance Diagnostic Tools

• *Multi-pronged surveys of:* households, firms and public officials [*‘triangulation’*]  
• *Experiential questions* (vs. ‘opinions’/generic)  
• Specially *designed* and tested *closed* questions  
• *Conceptual framework:* Incentive Structure behind Governance; focus on development  
• *Rigorous technical requirements in implementation*  
• *Local Institution Implements,* with WB Collaboration  
• *Recognizing Multidimensionality of Governance*  
• *Focus on Service Delivery:* Input for Action and Change
A few Illustrations

Challenge: poor governance and corruption

1. Establishment of Steering Committee
2. Diagnostic surveys + analysis
3. Draft of the NAS
4. Public dissemination + discussion
5. Revision of the NAS
6. Implementation by Government
7. Monitoring and Evaluation of NAS

Key Partnership: Government + Civil Society

Guatemala
Highly fragmented civil society
Joint effort (CMU, SDV, WBI) to build consensus

Sierra Leone
Strong commitment (civil society, state, donors) => surveys and report within a year. Results will be used for Institutional Reform Project

Honduras
CNA: report and strategy to newly elected gov (January 2001); integration of strategy in the 2002-2006 government plan
Additional cases

- Ghana: report and strategy (2000), integration of results into Bank projects, dissemination at national and regional level
- Colombia: report (2001). Strategy in progress, collaboration between government and steering committee
- Bolivia: report (2001); country reform policy for Judiciary and procurement
Misgoverned vs. well Governed Agencies in Ecuador (as ranked by public officials, 2000 diagnostic)
...In Ecuador, misgovernance is a regressive tax

Bribe/Total Income ratio, %

Low Income: 4.2
Middle Income: 2.1
High Income: 1.4
Public Officials Survey: Meritocracy in the Public Service Can Help Reduce Corruption

Meritocracy in Hiring and Promotion

y = -0.05x + 6.05
R² = 0.50
r=-0.71
Citizen Voice Improves Accessibility of Public Services to the Poor

Based on Public Officials Survey. The sample of institutions includes 44 national, departmental, and municipal agencies which are a prior anticipated to be accessible to the poor.
Transparency within Government Agencies Prevents Purchase of Public Positions

Based on 90 national, departmental, and municipal agencies covered in the Public Officials Survey.
Indonesia: A Country Case Illustrating the Bank seen as part of the problem in the past...towards part of the solution now
2004: Indonesia’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) is on Governance -- *Harnessing the entire Bank portfolio on Anti-Corruption (A-C)*

**Strategy:** Fully Mainstreaming Governance/A-C in the CAS Process--specifics

- Lending volumes linked to governance/A-C progress
- Anti-corruption plans for all projects
- Selecting projects linked to governance challenges *(saying No...)*
- Picking winners at the local level—*decentralized strategy*

**Staffing**

- Resident Governance Leader/Advisor
- Anti-Corruption Committee; collaboration w/ civil society
- In-house: Fiduciary team; Investigators & Project advisors
Indonesia: Anti-Corruption (A-C) Action Plans

Bank-funded projects in Indonesia must have an A-C plan, approved by the A-C Committee -- to include:

i) Disclosure; ii) Civil society oversight; iii) Complaints mechanism; iv) Anti-collusion; v) Sanctions and remedies; and, vi) Strengthened financial controls

Illustration of Some Recent Actions:

i) Misprocurement has been declared, funds returned;

ii) Funds have been suspended or cancelled;

iii) Prosecutions: number of consultants and civil servants being fined and/or jailed

Next: Other countries embarking in Governance CAS
Summing Up:
Evidence challenges some ‘popular’ notions

1. Country first needs to get to higher incomes to reach good governance, control of corruption
2. Legal-Historical Origins as key Determinant
3. ‘Transplants’ of OECD rules-based codes, etc.
4. Anticorruption by legal fiat
5. ‘Anti-Corruption Campaigns’, A-C Agencies
6. Culture as key determinant (vs. Incentives)
Most effective Anticorruption Measures?
Responses from Officials and Leaders in 62 countries

Deserving particular attention…

1. ‘Data Power’/Metrics Matters
2. External Accountability Mechanisms (*voice*)
3. Transparency Mechanisms (*e*governance, *data*)
4. Incentives as drivers, Prevention (*e.g.* Meritocracy)
5. The Role of the Firm and Elites (*influence*, *capture*)
6. Political Reform, *including* Political Finance
7. Governance: linking security & development
8. For Donor Countries, IFIs: i) Aid Effectiveness; ii) Trade; iii) access to ‘World Econ. Clubs’
Freedom of the Press to improve Rule of Law and Controlling Corruption

Sources: Freedom House, 2002 and KK2002
Listening to Stakeholders: Responses on Donor Aid and Anti-Corruption

Most Important Role for Donors in Helping Country on Anti-Corruption (A-C)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% respondents</th>
<th>0%</th>
<th>10%</th>
<th>20%</th>
<th>30%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Conditionality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work w/ Country A-C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness/Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control corruption in Donor projects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collaborate w/ NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors out of A-C</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of Responses selected as Most Important Role for Donors

On the growing gap between EU-accession countries and the rest of transition -- Rule of Law Over Time, Selected Regions, 1996-2002


Each region has the following number of countries: OECD: 28; East Asia (Developing): 35, East Asia (NIC): 4; Eastern Europe: 16; Former Soviet Union: 12; South Asia: 8; Sub-Saharan Africa: 47; Middle East North Africa: 21; Latin America and Caribbean: 38.
Governance Indicators: Chile 2002 vs. 1998

Source for data: http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002; Colors are assigned according to the following criteria: Dark Red, bottom 10\textsuperscript{th} percentile rank; Light Red between 10\textsuperscript{th} and 25\textsuperscript{th}; Orange, between 25\textsuperscript{th} and 50\textsuperscript{th}; Yellow, between 50\textsuperscript{th} and 75\textsuperscript{th}; Light Green between 75\textsuperscript{th} and 90\textsuperscript{th}; Dark Green above 90\textsuperscript{th}. 
Illustration of Concrete Projects and Programs promoting Transparency and Accountability

• Transparency & reform in political/party finance: e.g. new methods for disclosure (expenses), etc.
• E*disclosure (web) of votes of parliamentarians
• Public Disclosure of Assets/Incomes by public officials and legislators and their dependents
• E*procurement; e*data.governance; diagnostics
• In-depth Institutional Country Diagnostics for Agency and Budgetary transparency
• Delisting Firms Publicly
• Country takes the lead, participatory approach
• The ‘Governance CAS’ Strategic Approach
Data for Analysis and informing Policy
Advise, not for Precise Rankings

Data in this presentation is from aggregate governance indicators, surveys, and expert polls and is subject to a margin of error. It is not intended for precise comparative rankings across countries, but to illustrate performance measures to assist in drawing implications for strategy. It does not reflect official views on rankings by the World Bank or its Board of Directors. Errors are responsibility of the author(s), who benefited in this work from collaboration with many Bank staff and outside experts.

www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance