Several firms above are marked with one or more asterisks (*). The explanations for these are as follows:

* The period of ineligibility of the sanctioned firm extends to any firm directly or indirectly controlled by the sanctioned firm.

** The period of ineligibility of OREDAR extends to any firm directly or indirectly controlled by the sanctioned firm. The period of ineligibility of OREDAR may be reduced by up to one year if, after one year of ineligibility, the Sanctions Board determines that OREDAR has put in place a corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank and has implemented this program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank.

*** The period of ineligibility of any firm directly or indirectly controlled by Ms. Natalia Yasko may be reduced by up to one year if, after two years of ineligibility, the Sanctions Board determines that such firm has put in place a corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank and has implemented this program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank.

**** The period of ineligibility of UCII may be reduced by up to one year if, after one year of ineligibility, the Sanctions Board determines that UCII has put in place a corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank and has implemented this program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank.

***** The ineligibility of C.M. Pancho Construction Inc. extends to any firm directly or indirectly controlled by C.M. Pancho Construction Inc. The period of ineligibility may be reduced by up to two years if, after two years of ineligibility, the Sanctions Board determines that C.M. Pancho Construction Inc. has put in place an effective corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank and has implemented this program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank.

****** The ineligibility of Cavite Ideal International Construction and Development Corp. extends to any firm directly or indirectly controlled by Cavite Ideal International Construction and Development Corp. The period of ineligibility may be reduced by up to two years if, after two years of ineligibility, the Sanctions Board determines that Cavite Ideal International Construction and Development Corp. has put in place an effective corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank and has implemented this program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank.

******* The ineligibility of China Geo-Engineering Corporation extends to any firm directly or indirectly controlled by China Geo-Engineering Corporation. The period of ineligibility may be reduced by up to two years if, after three years of ineligibility, the Sanctions Board determines that China Geo-Engineering Corporation has put in place an effective corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank and has implemented this program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank.

******** The ineligibility of China Road and Bridge Corp. extends to any firm directly or indirectly controlled by China Road and Bridge Corp. The period of ineligibility may be reduced by up to three years if, after five years of ineligibility, the Sanctions Board determines that China Road and Bridge Corp. has put in place an effective corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank and has implemented this program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank.

********* The ineligibility of China State Construction Engineering Corp. extends to any firm directly or indirectly controlled by China State Construction Engineering Corp. The period of ineligibility may be reduced by up to two years if, after four years of ineligibility, the Sanctions Board determines that China State Construction Engineering Corp. has put in place an effective corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank and has implemented this program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank.

********** The ineligibility of China Wu Yi Co. Ltd. extends to any firm directly or indirectly controlled by China Wu Yi Co. Ltd. The period of ineligibility may be reduced by up to two years if, after four years of ineligibility, the Sanctions Board determines that China Wu Yi Co. Ltd. has put in place an effective corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank and has implemented this program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank.

*********** The ineligibility of E.C. de Luna Construction Corp. extends to any firm directly or indirectly controlled by E.C. de Luna Construction Corp.

************ The period of ineligibility may be reduced by up to two years if, after two years of ineligibility, Dongsung Construction Co. Ltd. has put in place a corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank.

************* The period of ineligibility will be extended by three years if the Sanctions Board determines that GENITE has failed to promptly put in place an effective corporate compliance program acceptable to the World Bank and to implement this program in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank.

************** The period of ineligibility may be reduced by four years if the Sanctions Board determines that Lahmeyer has put in place an acceptable corporate compliance and ethics program and has cooperated fully with the Bank in disclosing any past sanctionable misconduct, including through a review of its Bank-financed contracts. This debarment applies to Lahmeyer International GmbH, its successors and assigns, and to any other firm or individual that is directly or indirectly controlled by it or its successors or assigns.

World Bank Listing of Firms Letters of Reprimand

This List is Current

The firms listed below have received a letter of reprimand subsequent to an administrative process which permitted the firms to respond to the allegations made against them.

Until May 2004, the fraud and corruption provisions were contained in paragraphs 1.15(a) and 1.25(a) of the Procurement Guidelines and the Consultant Guidelines, respectively. Revisions to the Guidelines in May 2004 resulted in a new paragraph numbering of 1.14(a) and 1.22(a) respectively. In October 2006, the provisions were again revised, although the relevant paragraph numbering remained as 1.14(a) and 1.22(a) respectively.

The relevant excerpts of the Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits prior to May 2004 follow:

Fraud and Corruption

1.15 It is the Bank’s policy to require that Borrowers (including beneficiaries of Bank loans), as well as bidders/Suppliers/Contractors under Bank-financed contracts, observe the highest standard of ethics during the procurement and execution of such contracts. In pursuance of this policy, the Bank:

(a) defines, for the purposes of this provision, the terms set forth below as follows:

(i) “corrupt practice” means the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any thing of value to influence the action of a public official in the procurement process or in contract execution; and

(ii) “fraudulent practice” means a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement process or the execution of a contract to the detriment of the Borrower, and includes collusive practices among bidders (prior to or after bid submission) designed to establish bid prices at artificial, non-competitive levels and to deprive the Borrower of the benefits of free and open competition;

The relevant excerpts of the Guidelines for the Selection and Employment of Consultants under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits prior to May 2004 follow:

Fraud and Corruption

1.25 It is the Bank’s policy to require that Borrowers (including beneficiaries of Bank loans), as well as consultants under Bank-financed contracts, observe the highest standard of ethics during the selection and execution of such contracts. In pursuance of this policy, the Bank:

(a) defines, for the purposes of this provision, the terms set forth below as follows:

(i) “corrupt practice” means the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting of any thing of value to influence the action of a public official in the selection process or in contract execution; and

(ii) “fraudulent practice” means a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a selection process or the execution of a contract to the detriment of the Borrower, and includes collusive practices among consultants (prior to or after submission of proposals) designed to establish prices at artificial, noncompetitive levels and to deprive the Borrower of the benefits of free and open competition;

The relevant excerpts of the current Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits (May 2004, revised October 2006) follow:

Fraud and Corruption
1.14 It is the Bank’s policy to require that Borrowers (including beneficiaries of Bank loans), as well as bidders, suppliers, and contractors and their subcontractors under Bank-financed contracts, observe the highest standard of ethics during the procurement and execution of such contracts. [18] In pursuance of this policy, the Bank:

(a) defines, for the purposes of this provision, the terms set forth below as follows:

(i)  “corrupt practice” [19] is the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party;

(ii) “fraudulent practice” [20] is any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation;

(iii)  “collusive practice” [21] is an arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve an improper purpose, including to influence improperly the actions of another party;

(iv)  “coercive practice” [22] is impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improperly the actions of a party;

(v) "obstructive practice" is

(aa) deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or concealing of evidence material to the investigation or making false statements to investigators in order to materially impede a Bank investigation into allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent, coercive or collusive practice; and/or threatening, harassing or intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation or from pursuing the investigation; or

(bb) acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the Bank’s inspection and audit rights provided for under par. 1.14 (e) below.

The relevant excerpts of the current Guidelines for the Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers (May 2004, revised October 2006) follow:

Fraud and Corruption
1.22 It is the Bank’s policy to require that Borrowers (including beneficiaries of Bank loans), as well as consultants and their sub-consultants under Bank-financed contracts, observe the highest standard of ethics during the selection and execution of such contracts. [16]  In pursuance of this policy, the Bank:

(a) defines, for the purposes of this provision, the terms set forth below as follows:

(i) “corrupt practice” [17]is the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party;

(ii) “fraudulent practice”[18]is any act or omission, including misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation;

(iii) “collusive practices”[19] is an arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve an improper purpose, including to influence improperly the actions of another party;

(iv) “coercive practices”[20] is impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improperly the actions of a party;

(v) “obstructive practice” is

(aa)  deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering or concealing of evidence material to the investigation or making false statements to investigators in order to materially impede a Bank investigation into allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent, coercive, or collusive practice; and/or threatening, harassing, or intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of matters relevant to the investigation or from pursuing the investigation; or

(bb) acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the Bank’s inspection and audit rights provided for under paragraph 1.22(e) below.